From China with Love:  Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment by Stanley, Mary Ellen
Brooklyn Journal of International Law
Volume 40 | Issue 3 Article 8
2015
From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of
Foreign Investment
Mary Ellen Stanley
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Journal of
International Law by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Mary Ellen Stanley, From China with Love: Espionage in the Age of Foreign Investment, 40 Brook. J. Int'l L. (2015).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/bjil/vol40/iss3/8
FROM CHINA WITH LOVE: ESPIONAGE
IN THE AGE OF FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
“It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the nation.”1
INTRODUCTION
n March, 2012, Ralls Corporation (“Ralls”), a Delaware
corporation owned by Chinese executives, acquired four
Oregon-based limited liability companies that were formed to
develop wind farms. 2 The wind farms were located “in and
around” a restricted U.S. Navy (“Navy”) airspace and bombing
site. 3 Once the acquisition was complete, the Navy notified
Ralls that it was concerned about the location of one of the
wind farms.4 Although Ralls moved the contested wind farm,
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(“CFIUS” or the “Committee”) compelled Ralls to file a notice
with CFIUS to review the transaction.5 After CFIUS investi-
gated the transaction and attempted to mitigate the national
security concerns,6 CFIUS submitted its report and recommen-
dation to President Obama.7 On September 28, 2013, President
Obama mandated Ralls divest all property interests in the pro-
ject companies, terminate access to the project site, and refrain
from selling the project companies to third parties.8 Neither
1. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
2. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 301 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 304.
4. Id.
5. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24
(D.D.C. 2013) rev’d and remanded sub. nom. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
6. Neither the July order nor the CFIUS orders disclose the nature of the
national security threat or the evidence CFIUS utilized in making its deter-
mination and in issuing its orders. Id. at 305.
7. Id. President Obama’s veto was founded on CFIUS’s concerns regard-
ing the proximity of Ralls’ assets to the U.S. Naval Base. Karlee Weinman, In
Rare Move, CFIUS Hands Over Cache Of Ralls Docs, LAW360 (Nov. 26, 2014,
1:16 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/599760/in-unprecedented-move-
cfius-hands-over-cache-of-ralls-docs.
8. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 306.
I
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CFIUS nor President Obama notified Ralls of the evidence
supporting their decisions, and Ralls was never given an oppor-
tunity to rebut the evidence.9
After President Obama mandated that Ralls unwind the ac-
quisition (the “Presidential Order”), Ralls became the first par-
ty to challenge CFIUS’s authority and the Presidential Order
in court.10 On July 15, 2014, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia issued a controversial deci-
sion in Ralls Corporation v. Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States and held that the Presidential Order de-
prived Ralls of its property interests in the companies without
due process.11 Subsequently, in an unprecedented decision,12
the D.C. District Court ordered CFIUS to provide Ralls with
the information that supported the Presidential Order to un-
wind Ralls’ acquisition of the wind farm companies.13 The Ralls
decision illustrates an ongoing conflict between foreign inves-
tors and the CFIUS review process. Additionally, the decision
revived the debate about the efficacy and integrity of the mys-
terious reviews that consistently plague foreign direct invest-
ment (“FDI”) into the United States.14
9. Id.
10. Stewart Baker and Stephen Heifetz, Ralls May Give Foreign Investors
More Leverage with CFIUS, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2014, 11:21 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/603312/ralls-may-give-foreign-investors-
more-leverage-with-cfius.
11. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 321.
12. James Rosen, Judge Orders Obama to Explain Rejection of Chinese Bid
to Buy Oregon Wind Farms on National Security Grounds, MCCLATCHYDC
(Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/11/07/246230/judge-orders-
obama-to-explain.html. See also infra Part II.C.
13. The Obama administration handed over 3,487 pages of documents to
Ralls. CFIUS withheld two documents, citing privilege. Alex Guillén, Admin-
istration Hands Over Documents to Ralls, POLITICO (Nov. 25, 2014, 10:01
AM),
http://www.politico.com/morningenergy/1114/morningenergy16238.html.
14. There is constant debate about the extent to which the U.S. govern-
ment’s power should and may infringe on the rights of individuals when the
nation’s security is at risk. As a result, procedural aspects of maintaining
national security are in constant flux. Further, the U.S. government’s use of
biased or unscrupulous means to protect the nation’s security arguably sacri-
fices the integrity of the U.S. government’s efforts. See generally, John Yoo,
The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Pro-
grams, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901 (2014); David Jackson, White House:
Review Will Address Global NSA Concerns, World Leaders React to NSA Spy-
ing Reports, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2013, 9:35 AM),
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Throughout U.S. history, national security has been a para-
mount concern of the U.S. government.15 In recent decades,
burgeoning technologies and the rise of unconventional acts of
terror have heightened fears for the nation’s security. These
fears have resulted in the perception of new threats to the na-
tion’s security and a labyrinthine definition of “national securi-
ty.”16 Conventional acts of espionage––those primarily associ-
ated with identifiable persons or groups––have conceptually
merged with cybersecurity breaches and industrial espionage.17
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) notably remarked
that “[t]he Cold War is not over, it has merely moved to a new
arena: the global marketplace.”18 This amalgamation of threats
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/28/obama-national-
security-agency-surveillance-germany-merkel/3286709/; Eileen Donahoe,
Why the NSA Undermines National Security, REUTERS (Mar. 6, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/03/06/why-nsa-surveillance-
undermines-national-security/; Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (stating
that wire-tapping and disclosure in this case did not rise to the level of search
or seizure as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment); Rasul v. Bush, 542
U.S. 466 (2004) (discussing the legality and conditions of alien’s confinement
in the United States at Guantonomo Bay, Cuba); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507 (2004) (discussing petition for writ of habeus corpus on behalf of a
U.S. citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant captured in Afghanistan);
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (discussing petition for writ of habe-
as corpus in which a prisoner, who was a U.S. citizen, challenged his deten-
tion as an “enemy combatant); see infra Part III.
15. See generally Subversive Activities Control Act, ch. 1024, Pub. L. 81–
831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950); Espionage Act, ch. 30, Pub. L. 65–24, 40 Stat. 217
(1917); Defense Production Act, ch. 932, Pub. L. 81–774, 64 Stat. 798 (1950).
16. These newly perceived national security threats include “non-state
actors, including organized crime syndicates and transnational terrorists;
and ordinarily legitimate business organizations.” Robert Gray Bracknell,
Trust Not Their Presents, Nor Admit the Horse: Countering the Technically-
Based Espionage Threat, 12 ROGERWILLIAMS U. L. REV. 832, 833 (2007).
17. Industrial Espionage is defined as “spying directed towards discover-
ing the secrets of a rival industrial company, manufacturer, etc.” Industrial
Espionage, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/94848?redirectedFrom=industrial+espionage
#eid538333 (last visited April 5, 2014).
18. Souvik Saha, CFIUS Now Made in China: Dueling National Security
Review Frameworks as a Countermeasure to Economic Espionage in the Age
of Globalization, 33 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 199, 200 (2012) (citing Economic
Espionage, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www2.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm). Additionally, Dennis C. Blair, for-
mer Director of National Intelligence stated, “[G]lobal economic turmoil and
the instability it could ignite had outpaced terrorism as the most urgent
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has created a “poisoned climate” in which to balance the na-
tion’s economic prosperity and national security.19 In this envi-
ronment, cyber-espionage has threatened prominent U.S. busi-
nesses, including Home Depot and J.P. Morgan Chase.20 These
events illustrate widespread flaws in corporate and govern-
ment security across the globe.
As globalization accelerates and the world’s largest corpora-
tions conduct cross-border transactions with increasing fre-
quency,21 businesses can be victims of espionage, or instead be-
come vessels for espionage through FDI.22 This can occur in two
ways: first, when a State-owned or government-connected enti-
ty conducts business in the United States; and second, when a
foreign entity purchases a U.S. business.23 Foreign ownership
threat facing the United States.” Blair attributed Pakistan’s problems to the
fact that it was one of the countries most significantly affected by the econom-
ic crisis. Mark Mazzeti, Global Economy Top Threat to U.S., Spy Chief Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A14,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/washington/13intel.html?_r=0.
19. CLAUDE BARFIELD, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. ECON. STUD., TELECOMS AND
THE HUAWEI CONUNDRUM: CHINESE FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 10 (2011), http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/-
telecoms-and-the-huawei-conundrum-chinese-foreign-direct-investment-in-
the-united-states_103528582558.pdf.
20. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Matthew Goldstein & Nicole Perlroth,
JPMorgan Chase Hacking Affects 76 Million Households, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2014, 12:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/jpmorgan-discovers-
further-cyber-security-issues/?_r=0. In addition to the J.P. Morgan hack,
which occurred overseas, it was reported that the group targeted additional
companies including Citigroup, HSBC, E-Trade, Regions, and Automatic Da-
ta Processing Inc. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, JPMorgan Hackers
Said to Probe 13 Financial Firms, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 9, 2014, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-09/jpmorgan-hackers-said-to-probe-
13-financial-firms.html.
21. For example, Morgan Stanley plans to sell its Global Oil Merchanting
Business to Rosneft, Russia’s leader in the Petroleum industry. Morgan Stan-
ley to Sell Global Oil Merchanting Business to Rosneft, MORGAN STANLEY
(Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/articles/00ddb583-1c3c-4dd9-
b27f-6023c884aae3.html.
22. Foreign direct investment is “investment by a company in a country
other than that in which the company is based.” Foreign Direct Investment,
Oxford ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/73063?redirectedFrom=foreign+direct+invest
ment#eid3752331.
23. In this Note, “U.S. corporation” is used to refer generally to a business
incorporated in one of the fifty states.
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of U.S. entities establishes a foreign presence in the United
States and enables theft of “American technology, intellectual
property, and sensitive information pertaining to critical infra-
structure.”24
While the FBI, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Se-
curity Agency address certain security concerns stemming from
foreign investments, CFIUS is the government agency charged
with preserving this nuanced component of national security.25
CFIUS is an inter-agency committee of the U.S. government26
and is authorized to review transactions that could “result in
control of a U.S. business by a foreign person.”27 CFIUS con-
ducts such reviews to determine whether certain transactions
pose national security threats.28 However, this review places an
additional burden on CFIUS’s duties as a governmental agen-
cy. CFIUS must maintain and protect U.S. national security
while simultaneously balancing the business interests of for-
eign investors.29
CFIUS’s secretive evaluations—and its power—have become
an increasingly contested political issue, both domestically and
abroad.30 In the United States, these debates have garnered
significant legislative responses. For example, Congresswoman
Rosa DeLauro recently proposed legislation to amend the
CFIUS review process to include an evaluation of whether the
transaction results in a “net benefit” to the United States.31 In
24. Matthew Crosston, Soft Spying: Leveraging Globalization as Proxy
Military Rivalry, 28 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 105,
109 (2014).
25. Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, DEP’T
TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-in-US.aspx
(last updated Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter CFIUS, DEP’T TREASURY].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. “[T]he very fact of foreign ownership is correlated with an increased
risk of harm to the national security through such things as the leakage of
critical defense technologies.” CFIUS and the Role of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in the U.S.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Internation-
al Monetary Policy, Trade and Technology of the H. Comm. On Fin. Services,
109th Cong. 4, 60 (2006) (statement of Professor Daniel K. Tarullo, Geo. U. L.
Center) [hereinafter Hearing].
30. See infra Parts II &III.
31. H.R. 5581, 113th Cong. §1 (2014). For further discussion of Congress-
woman DeLauro’s Bill, see infra Part III.
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the international arena, as a response to CFIUS reviews, na-
tions such as the People’s Republic of China (“China”) have in-
stituted their own protectionist regimes.32 Critics of CFIUS as-
sert a variety of complaints, alleging both inaction and preju-
diced reviews.33 The correct balance must be struck, between
ensuring the nation’s security and promoting FDI, if all the
foregoing concerns are to be addressed.
This Note argues that the U.S. government should neither
explicitly define “national security” in the context of CFIUS re-
views, nor expand its definition to include a “net-benefit” or
economic review, as proposed by Congresswoman DeLauro’s
legislation.34 Rather, the definition of “national security” should
remain undefined to allow the government to adapt its security
reviews to unpredictable and evolving threats. Alternatively,
the type of “covered transaction[s]” that CFIUS has the power
to review should be amended. CFIUS jurisdiction should not
hinge upon traditional, corporate law distinctions that define
control only in terms of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers.
Rather, CFIUS’s jurisdiction should maintain a more equitable
approach to other types of nontraditional control that could
pose a security threat.35 An amended definition of a “covered
transaction” should include leases, construction, and additional
investments. 36 A more inclusive definition that directs the
Committee’s focus to examine the substance and effect of trans-
actions, rather than merely the structure, will provide a more
comprehensive review of FDI. These amendments will not only
eliminate loopholes in the enacting legislation, but also in-
crease the quality and integrity of CFIUS national security re-
views. Additionally, such amendments will nurture the United
States’ presence in international markets by not further dis-
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra Parts II & III.
34. H.R. 5581; see infra Part III.
35. The existence of equitable doctrines in corporate law, which includes
concepts like estoppel, piercing the corporate veil, or alter ego theory, demon-
strates that CFIUS’s governing law, which is principally corporate, cannot
solely rely on legal formalities.
36. This Note will focus on leases, but the scope of CFIUS’s inquiry should
be amended to include the construction of new facilities as well as additional
or incremental investments. Such transactions implicate national security
issues similar to those raised by leases, such as proximity to sensitive U.S.
government facilities.
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couraging FDI with a more economically focused and intrusive
national security review.
Part I of this Note outlines CFIUS’s structure and the multi-
step CFIUS review process by examining Section 721 of the De-
fense of Production Act of 1950 (“Section 721”),37 as amended
by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,
and regulations at 31 C.F.R. Part 800.38 Part II discusses prior
international business transactions that have both successfully
and unsuccessfully undergone CFIUS review. This discussion
primarily focuses on international business transactions in-
volving parties from China because such transactions have
garnered the most political opposition. Part III addresses re-
cently proposed legislation prompting the aggressive expansion
of the scope of CFIUS reviews. Part IV surveys China’s nation-
al security review of FDI and further compares and contrasts
China’s national security review with CFIUS’s review proce-
dures. Finally, Part V analyzes and evaluates the CFIUS re-
view process. This Part concludes by proposing amendments to
CFIUS’s enacting legislation and articulating the positive ef-
fects such amendments would have on the quality of the review
process and on the fairness, legitimacy, and security of FDI in
the United States.
I: THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THEUNITED
STATES
Since the Ford administration established CFIUS in 1975,39
the Committee and its legal authority have undergone signifi-
cant legal reforms to address the nuanced evolution of national
security.40 As a result, CFIUS’s authority, purpose, multi-step
review process, and disclosure obligations have been memorial-
37. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, Pub. L. 110–49, 121
Stat. 246 (2007).
38. 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008).
39. Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975).
40. Paul Connell & Tian Huang, An Empirical Analysis of CFIUS: Exam-
ining Foreign Investment Regulation in the United States, 39 YALE J. INT’L L.
131, 132 (2014). Such reforms include the 2007 enactment of FINSA, the
amendment of Executive Order 1188 in 2008, revision of CFIUS regulation in
2008, and publication of guidance on CFIUS’s national security considera-
tions in 2008. Additionally, Executive Orders that have altered the legal
landscape of national security include 12661, 12860, 13286, 13456 from Pres-
idents Reagan, Clinton, and Bush respectively. CFIUS, DEP’T TREASURY, su-
pra note 25.
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ized in various pieces of legislation. This Part will articulate
CFIUS’s structure, CFIUS’s legislative history and authority,
and the multiple steps of the CFIUS review process. Addition-
ally, this part will also provide a statistical analysis of CFIUS’s
reviews from its Annual Reports.
A. Legislative Authority and Structure of CFIUS
CFIUS currently operates pursuant to Section 72141 and 31
C.F.R. Part 800.42 Section 721 authorizes the President to sus-
pend or prohibit a “covered transaction,”43 which is defined as
“any merger, acquisition or takeover . . . by or with any foreign
person which could result in foreign control of any person en-
gaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”44 A “cov-
ered transaction” does not include other types of transactions,
however, such as greenfield investments,45 asset acquisitions,46
leases,47 lending transactions,48 and incremental acquisitions.49
41. Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA), Pub. L. 110–
49, 121 Stat. 246 (2007). FINSA, signed into law by President Bush, institut-
ed long-awaited reform. Most importantly, it asserts and maintains “the con-
fidentiality of the CFIUS review process and involves Congress in that pro-
cess only in an oversight role, with after-the-fact reports.” Thomas E. Crocker
& Joe D. Whitley, Congress Enacts CFIUS Reform Legislation, ADMIN. & REG.
L. NEWS, Spring 2008, at 5.
42. CFIUS, DEP’T TREASURY, supra note 25. Section 721 was amended by
FINSA, also known as the Exon Florio Amendment. CFIUS, DEP’T
TREASTURY, supra note 25.
43. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, sec 6.
44. Foreign Investment and National Security Act, sec. 2.
45. A “greenfield” investment is also known as a start-up investment.
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, CFIUS REFORM: FINAL REGULATIONS ISSUED
ON NOVEMBER 14, 2008, at 1 (2008), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/Summary-FinalRegs.pdf.
46. An “asset acquisition” is not considered a covered transaction if the
assets do not constitute a “U.S. business.” Id.
47. “Long-term leases” are only covered if a foreign lessee “makes substan-
tially all business decisions concerning operation of a leased U.S. business, as
if it were the owner.” Id.
48. A “lending transaction” is not a covered transaction unless the foreign
person “acquires financial or governance rights characteristic of an equity
investment, but not of a loan. Imminent default giving a foreign person actu-
al control of collateral that constitutes a U.S. business is a covered transac-
tion—but lenders in the ordinary course may qualify for an exception.” Id.
49. “Incremental acquisitions” are not covered transactions. Id. (“After
CFIUS concludes action on a covered transaction, the foreign person’s acqui-
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Importantly, the statute’s finality provision exempts the Presi-
dent’s findings from judicial review.50
CFIUS is an inter-agency committee for which the Secretary
of the Treasury serves as chairperson.51 Notices are “received,
processed, and coordinated” by the CFIUS Staff Chairperson.52
Additional members of the Committee include the heads of the
Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, De-
partment of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of
State, Department of Energy, Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, and Office of Science and Technology Policy.53 The
CFIUS review process is structurally protected from politiciza-
tion by Congress, because the oversight powers of Congress are
retrospective only.54 Nevertheless, CFIUS still maintains ties
to bipartisan politics.55 To maintain accountability for CFIUS
actions, Section 721 requires CFIUS to submit an annual re-
port56 to Congress detailing its reviews of international busi-
sition of additional interest in a U.S. business is not a new covered transac-
tion.”)
50. Foreign Investment & National Security Act, Pub. L. 110–49, sec. 6,
§ 721 (d)(1), 121 Stat. 246, 256 (2007) (“The President may exercise the au-
thority . . . only if the President finds that . . . there is credible evidence that
leads the President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control
might take action that threatens to impair the national security.”).
51. Composition of CFIUS, DEP’T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010).
52. The CFIUS staff chairperson is the Director of the Office of Investment
Security in the Department of the Treasury. Id. The Department of the
Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce and Justice typically are the most
active in the review process. Joanna Rubin Travalini, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in the United States: Achieving a Balance between National Economy
Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 779, 783
(2009).
53. When appropriate, the Office of Management & Budget, Council of
Economic Advisors, National Security Council, National Economic Council,
and Homeland Security Council observe and participate in Committee activi-
ties. Id.
54. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (b)(3), (m) (2007); See also supra note 41.
55. See infra Part II. See generally, JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES (2014); Matthew C. Sullivan, CFIUS and Congress Reconsidered: Fire
Alarms, Police Patrols, and a New Oversight Regime, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L
L. &DISP. RESOL. 199 (2009).
56. The annual report includes the following: empirical data relating to the
filed notices, reviews, investigations, withdrawn notices, and decisions, in-
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ness transactions.57 Additionally, the Committee must deliver a
certified report to Congress upon completing an investigation––
and the lead agency must transmit the contents and results of
the investigation to members of Congress58––unless the matter
was sent to the President for decision.59 Some argue CFIUS has
evolved into a “congressional notification service” due to the
fact that Congress has responded to economic crises by expand-
ing its supervision of CFIUS.60
B. The CFIUS Review Process
CFIUS reviews proceed on both a voluntary and involuntary
basis because parties to an international transaction are not
required to file notice of a covered transaction with the Com-
mittee. However, due to procedural protections afforded to vol-
untary filers,61 parties to a transaction have strong incentives
to voluntarily file notice. These protections stem from a “safe
harbor” provision62 and from the President’s power to retroac-
tively unwind a transaction after it has closed.63 As a result,
most parties file voluntarily.64 If a party to a transaction de-
formation about the business sectors involved in the filings, examples of miti-
gation measures and methods of compliance, the countries from which in-
vestments originated, and an analysis concerning critical technologies. For-
eign Investment & National Security Act, Pub. L. 110–49, sec. 7, § 721(m)(1)–
(3), 121 Stat. 246, 257–258 (2007).
57. Id. § 721(m).
58. Reports include specifically “a description of actions taken by the
Committee with respect to the transaction” and “identification of the deter-
minative factors considered under subsection (f).” Id. § 721(b)(3)(C)(i)(I)–(II).
59. Id. § 721(b)(3)(B).
60. All recent CFIUS amendments are preceded by congressionally op-
posed transactions. David Zaring, CFIUS as a Congressional Notification
Service, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 81, 90, 99 (2009).
61. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by
Foreign Persons 31 C.F.R. § 800.402 (2004).
62. 31 C.F.R. § 800.601 (2004). The safe harbor provision provides for the
“Finality of actions under section 721.” The power of both the President and
Committee under Section 721 remains at the President’s discretion. However,
such authority will not be exercised if “The President has previously an-
nounced . . . his decision not to exercise his author under section 721 with
respect to the covered transaction.” Id.
63. Id.
64. Thomas S. Vaughn & Shang Kong, Comply with Foreign Investment
Rules, CFIUS Reviews Will Become More Common as Chinese Companies
Invest More in the United States, but Careful Preparation Can Help Compa-
nies Navigate a Complex Process, CHINA BUS. REV. (Nov. 25, 2013),
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cides not to file a voluntary written notice with CFIUS, the
President or CFIUS can unilaterally compel a review.65
Once a review commences, the initial review period may last
up to thirty days.66 During this time, the Committee examines
the transaction to identify any national security concerns.67
These concerns include the control of U.S. businesses that pro-
vide goods or services to the U.S. government; products or ser-
vices that could expose vulnerabilities in cybersecurity; busi-
nesses involved in critical infrastructure,68 defense, security,
weapons, or munitions manufacturing; and businesses in close
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/complying-with-foreign-investment-
rules/. Parties must file in compliance with the procedures stated in 31 C.F.R.
§ 800.401 and must include the information required in 31 C.F.R. § 800.402.
65. 50 U.S.C. App § 2170(b)(1)(D) (2007).
66. Filing Instructions, DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-filing-instructions.aspx
(last visited May 15, 2015).
67. Process Overview, DEP’T TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-overview.aspx (last visit-
ed May 15, 2015). The following factors may be considered in this calculus:
(1) domestic production needed for national defense requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet nation-
al defense requirements . . . (3) the control of domestic industries and
commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and
capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of national
security, (4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transac-
tion on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any coun-
try . . . , (5) the potential effects of the proposed or pending transac-
tion on United States international technological leadership in areas
affecting United States national security; (6) the potential national
security-related effects on the United States critical technologies; (7)
whether the covered transaction is a foreign government-controlled
transaction . . . , (10) the long-term projection of United States re-
quirements for sources of energy and other critical resources and
materials; and (11) such other factors as the president or the Com-
mittee may determine to be appropriate generally or in connection
with a specific review or investigation.
50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f).
68. 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 defines Critical Infrastructure as,
in the context of a particular covered transaction, a system or asset,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the in-
capacity or destruction of the particular system or asset of the entity
over which control is acquired pursuant to that covered transaction
would have a debilitating impact on national security.
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proximity to certain U.S. government facilities.69 Most reviews
are completed within the initial thirty-day period. However,
CFIUS may, under certain circumstances, initiate a subse-
quent investigation that must be completed within forty-five
days after the initial thirty-day review.70 Once an investigation
is underway, parties to a transaction may request the with-
drawal of their notice.71 This request of withdrawal must be
approved by CFIUS, which may impose conditions on the par-
ties72 and track the transaction thereafter.73 In the event that a
dispute is referred to the President for decision,74 Section 721
requires the President to decide whether to “suspend or prohib-
it the transaction” within fifteen days of the completion of the
CFIUS investigation.75
Parties often agree to mitigation measures to alleviate press-
ing security concerns.76 Although public disclosure of the speci-
ficities of reviews is expressly prohibited, various examples of
mitigation measures have been published in CFIUS’s annual
reports to Congress.77 Examples of mitigation measures in the
report include the following: “[e]nsuring only U.S. citizens han-
dle certain products and services, and ensuring that certain
activities and products are located only in the United States,”
“[n]otifying relevant USG parties of any awareness of any vul-
nerability or security incidents,” and the “[t]ermination of spe-
cific activities of the U.S. business.”78 Mitigation measures are
monitored through means such as periodic reports to govern-
69. COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS CY 2012, at 22 (2013) [hereinafter 2012 ANNUAL
REPORT].
70. 31 C.F.R. § 800.503–06.
71. 31 C.F.R. § 800.507.
72. These conditions are “interim protections to address specific national
security concerns identified during the review or investigation of the with-
drawn transaction.” COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TOCONGRESS CY 2013, at 20 (2015) [hereinafter 2013
ANNUALREPORT].
73. 31 C.F.R. § 800.507(i)–(ii).
74. See generally, Exec. Order No. 13,456, 73 Fed. Reg. 4677, § 6(c) (2008);
31 C.F.R. § 800.506.
75. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1). Process Overview, supra note 67.
76. From 2011 to 2013, twenty-seven reviews resulted in the use of legally
binding mitigation measures. In 2013 alone, there were eleven cases in which
mitigation measures were used. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 20.
77. Id.
78. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 72, at 20.
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ment agencies, on-site reviews, third-party audits, and remedi-
al measures if breaches occur or are suspected.79
C. Statistical Analysis of Recent Trends in CFIUS Review
The history of CFIUS activities in recent years is outlined in
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States An-
nual Report to Congress.80 In light of the continued recovery
from the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, not only has the
number of investigations increased,81 but the number of notices
withdrawn after the commencement of an investigation has
also dramatically increased.82 In total from 2009–2013, 480 no-
tices were filed, 17 were withdrawn, 193 investigations were
conducted, 38 notices were withdrawn after commencement of
investigation, and one Presidential decision has been ren-
dered.83 Additionally, due to changes in international markets
and new national security threats, the types of industries
prompting review have either gained or diminished in promi-
nence. In 2009, “Manufacturing” accounted for 32 percent of all
notices filed, “Finance, Information, and Services” accounted
for 34 percent, “Mining, Utilities, and Construction” accounted
for 29 percent, and “Wholesale, Retail, and Transportation” ac-
79. Id.
80. See generally 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 69; 2013 ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 72.
81. In 2009, twenty-five investigations were conducted; in 2010, thirty-
five; in 2011, forty; in 2012, forty-five; in 2013, forty-eight. ANNUALREPORT TO
CONGRESS CY 2013, supra note 72, at 3. The increased number of investiga-
tions is attributed to “delays tied to the government’s shut down . . . [and]
heightened scrutiny by the committee—as well as a renewed boldness among
deal-makers, including Chinese outfits targeting a wider range of plays.” Fur-
thermore, it also possible that Chinese investors are now moving into differ-
ent investment sectors “where perhaps in the past they might’ve been reluc-
tant to proceed” and that the increase indicates that “CFIUS . . . year over
year, grows more sophisticated in its approach.” Karlee Weinmann, Chinese
Buyers Appear Undaunted as CFIUS Toughens Up, LAW360 (Mar. 2, 2015,
6:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/626401/chinese-buyers-appear-
undaunted-as-cfius-toughens-up.
82. The number of “notices withdrawn after commencement of investiga-
tion” have dramatically increased from 2009–2012. However, the number
decreased in 2013. In 2009, two notices were withdrawn; in 2010, six; in
2011, five; in 2012, twenty; in 2013, five. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS CY
2013, supra note 72, at 3.
83. Id.
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counted for 5 percent.84 More recently in 2013, “Manufactur-
ing”85 rose to 36 percent, “Finance, Information, and Services”86
dropped to 33 percent, with “Mining, Utilities, and Construc-
tion” 87 dropping to 21 percent, and “Wholesale, Retail, and
Transportation”88 rising to 10 percent.89
PART II: RECENT TRANSACTIONS AND CFIUS REVIEW
The following transactions illustrate the capacious scope of
what constitutes a “national security” concern.90 Additionally,
the disputed deals referenced below exhibit the review’s impli-
cations in both politics and international diplomacy.
A. Recent Transactions Approved by CFIUS
One prominent critique of CFIUS is that the scope of what
constitutes “national security” is not clearly defined and thus
allows CFIUS to conduct reviews of transactions that do not
have clear national security implications.91 An example of an
unconventional use of the term “national security” is the con-
84. Id. at 4.
85. “Manufacturing” includes the following sectors: “Computer and Elec-
tronic Product,” “Machinery,” “Transportation Equipment,” “Electrical
Equipment, Appliance, and Component,” “Chemical,” “Fabricated Metal
Product,” “Nonmetallic Mineral Product,” “Textile Product Mills,” “Primary
Metal,” and “Plastics and Rubber Products.” Id. at 6.
86. “Finance,” “Information,” and “Services” include the following sectors:
“Professional, Scientific and Technical Services,” “Telecommunications,”
“Publishing Industries (except internet),” “Administrative and Support Staff,”
“Real Estate,” “Securities, Commodities Contracts, and Other Financial In-
vestments and Related Activities,” “Credit Intermediation and Related Activ-
ities,” “Rental and Leasing Services,” and “Data Processing, Hosting, and
Related Services.” Id. at 9.
87. “Mining,” “Utilities,” and “Construction” include the following sectors:
“Utilities,” “Mining,” “Oil and Gas Extraction,” “Support Activities for Min-
ing,” “Specialty Trade Contractors,” and “Construction of Buildings.” Id. at
13.
88. “Wholesale,” “Retail,” and “Transportation” include the following sec-
tors: “Support Activities for Transportation,” “Merchant Wholesalers, Nondu-
rable Goods,” “Merchant Wholesalers, Durable Goods,” “Pipeline Transporta-
tion,” and “Water Transportation.” Id. at 15.
89. Id. at 4.
90. 50 U.S.C. App § 2170(b)(1)(D).
91. Jason Cox, Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment After the Dubai
Ports Controversy: Has the U.S. Government Finally Figured Out How to
Balance Foreign Threats to National Security Without Alienating Foreign
Companies?, 34 U. IOWA J. CORP. L. 293, 307–309 (2009).
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sideration of food safety as a national security concern. In May
2013, China’s Shuanghui International (“Shuanghui”) acquired
the U.S. Company Smithfield Foods (“Smithfield”) for $7.1 bil-
lion,92 creating the world’s “Leading Global Pork Enterprise.”93
The two parties voluntarily submitted the transaction to
CFIUS for review.94 CFIUS approved the sale, despite the fact
that the deal was met with a “fair amount of scrutiny” 95
through significant political opposition.96 Several government
officials appealed to CFIUS to scrutinize the deal97 because
92. Karlee Weinmann, New Bill Rekindles CFIUS Debate 1 Year After
Smithfield, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/
580895/new-bill-rekindles-cfius-debate-1-year-after-smithfield. The $4.7 bil-
lion bid was 31 percent over Smithfield’s closing share price. Michael J. De
La Merced & Mark Scott, China’s Big Food Deal, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2013,
10:02 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/morning-agenda-chinas-
big-food-deal/.
93. Shuanghui International and Smithfield Foods Complete Strategic
Combination, Creating a Leading Global Pork Enterprise, SMITHFIELD FOODS
(Sept. 26, 2013),
http://investors.smithfieldfoods.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=793522.
94. Dana Mattioli et al., China Makes Biggest U.S. Play, Asian Meat Giant
Strikes $4.7 Billion Deal for Virginia’s Smithfield Foods,WALL ST. J., May 30,
2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324412604578512722044165
756.
95. Foreign Ag Buyouts Concern Ag Committee Chairwoman Stabenow,
FARM FUTURES (Sept. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Foreign Ag Buyouts],
http://farmfutures.com/story-foreign-ag-buyouts-concern-ag-committee-
chairwoman-stabenow-0-117715.
96. Id. Senator Debbie Stabenow, Democrat from Michigan and chairwom-
an of the Senate Agriculture Committee, stated as follows:
It remains unclear what factors the committee took into account in
making its decision. We still do not know if the potential impact on
American food security, the transfer of tax-payer funded innovation
to a foreign competitor, or China’s protectionist trade barriers were
considered. It’s troubling that taxpayers have received no assurances
that these critical issues have been taken into account in transfer-
ring control of one of America’s largest food producers to a Chinese
competitor with a spotty record on food safety.
Michael J. De La Merced, U.S. Security Panel Clears a Chinese Takeover of
Smithfield Foods, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at B4,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/national-security-panel-approves-
smithfield-sale-to-chinese-company/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. Such
opposition included numerous congressional hearings.
97. Helena Bottemiller, Government Extends Review of Smithfield-
Shuangui Deal, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (July 25, 2013),
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they were concerned the threat of food contamination was a
national security concern.98
Another CFIUS review that questioned Chinese presence
through a Canadian company located in the United States, but
was nevertheless approved, was the takeover of Nexen, a Ca-
nadian oil and gas company, by China National Offshore Oil
Corp. (“CNOOC”), a Chinese state-owned entity.99 The acquisi-
tion was slated to give CNOOC “new offshore production in the
North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and off western Africa, as well
as oil-producing properties in the Middle East and Canada.”100
The parties notified CFIUS of the transaction before it closed,
but later withdrew their original notice and refiled “to accom-
modate mitigation measures proposed by CFIUS.”101 However,
the acquisition was approved despite CFIUS’s prior concerns in
accordance with CNOOC’s 2005 failed attempt to buy
UNOCAL Corp., a major petroleum producer, for $18.5 bil-
lion.102 The UNOCAL transaction103 was blocked by CFIUS due
to national security concerns.104
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/07/government-extends-review-of-
smithfield-shuangui-deal/#.VgRiAU10z5o.
98. Foreign Ag Buyouts, supra note 95.
99. Roberta Rampton & Scott Haggett, CNOOC-Nexen Deal Wins U.S.
Approval, its Last Hurdle, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/12/us-nexen-cnooc-
idUSBRE91B0SU20130212.
100. Id.
101. Alexandra López-Casero, A Year in Review: More Transactions Run
into CFIUS Trouble, NIXON PEABODY (Jan. 16, 2014),
www.nixonpeabody.com/files/167021_M_and_A_16JAN2014.pdf.
102. Rampton & Haggett, supra note 99.
103. CNOOC’s proposal raised great concern in Congress regarding national
security issues related to the “possibility of a foreign company taking control
of a U.S. company in an already tight energy market.” Congress produced a
House Resolution, calling for President Bush to review the transaction.
CNOOC, noting their readiness for CFIUS review, wrote letters to lobby
Congress. CNOOC assured Congress that that “substantially all of the oil and
gas produced by Unocal in the U.S. will continue to be sold in the U.S.” and
pledged to “retain the jobs of substantially all of Unocal’s employees, includ-
ing those in the U.S.” However, due to fierce political opposition, CNOOC
withdrew their bid. Gaurav Sud, From Fretting Takeovers to Vetting CFIUS:
Finding a Balance in U.S. Policy Regarding Foreign Acquisitions of Domestic
Assets, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1303, 1305–06 (2006) (citing June 2005
letter from CNOOC to Congress).
104. Rampton & Haggett, supra note 99.
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More illustrative of the current economic climate is the re-
view of transactions concerning cyber-technology. Because of
the pervasiveness of internet connectivity in daily life, national
security concerns have largely shifted to the electronic realm. A
recent deal implicating cybersecurity concerns was the pur-
chase of a sector of International Business Machines Corp.
(“IBM”) by Lenovo Group Ltd.105 The $2.3 billion deal proposed
in January 2014, remained in extended limbo due to security
concerns, including that “servers could be accessed remotely by
Chinese spies or hackers or compromised through mainte-
nance.”106 Concerns were premised on the fact that the IBM
x86 servers being acquired were utilized “in the nation’s com-
munications networks and in data centers that support the
Pentagon’s computer networks,”107 and that “U.S. regulators
were concerned ‘Chinese Spies’ may be able to access the Pen-
tagon’s servers and weaken national security.”108 Months after
China’s Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) approved the buy-
out, CFIUS gave the green light for the transaction to move
forward.109 The deal closed on October 1, 2014, with a lower
closing price of $2.1 billion due to changes in the valuation of
inventory and deferred revenue liability.110 This transaction’s
105. In 2005, Lenovo faced review of its purchase of IBM’s personal com-
puter business. The transaction was scrutinized due to concerns over China’s
ability to infiltrate computer systems. The U.S. government demanded that
the building Lenovo and IBM would share in North Carolina be sealed off to
alleviate national security concerns. Saha, supra note 18, at 205.
106. Following this transaction, the U.S. Air Force returned shipments of
Lenovo laptops after it was discovered that they made unauthorized connec-
tions to Chinese networks. Spencer E. Ante, IBM, Lenovo Tackle Security
Worries on Server Deal, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/articles/ibm-lenovo-tackle-security-concerns-over-server-
deal-1403733716.
107. Id.
108. Tom Spring, Lenovo’s $2.3 Billion IBM Deal Inches Closer to Approval,
CRN (July 7, 2014), http://www.crn.com/news/data-center/300073332/lenovos-
2-3-billion-ibm-deal-inches-closer-to-approval.htm.
109. IBM Issues Statement on U.S. Government Regulatory Approval of x86-
Based Server Divestiture to Lenovo, IBM (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www-
03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/44588.wss.
110. Gerry Shih, Lenovo Says $2.1 Billion IBM x86 Server Deal to Close on
Wednesday, RUETERS (Sept 29, 2014, 3:11 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/29/us-lenovo-ibm-deals-
idUSKCN0HO08N20140929.
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lower closing price exhibits another consequence of the pro-
longed and mysterious CFIUS review process.
Another collective criticism of CFIUS is that the review pro-
cess has been manipulated into a biased political tool against
foreign investors.111 One of the most noteworthy reviews, the
Dubai Ports World (“DPW”) controversy, prompted Congress to
reform CFIUS with the passage of the Foreign Investment Na-
tional Security Act (“FINSA”) in 2007.112 DPW proposed to ac-
quire the British-owned Peninsula and Oriental Navigation
Company, including its U.S. subsidiary, which operated sixteen
sites at various U.S. ports.113 CFIUS’s approval of the transac-
tion114 resulted in fierce bipartisan opposition115 due to its na-
tional security implications. DPW is controlled by the govern-
ment of Dubai and thus the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”),
which was both an “ally in the war on terror” and a critical im-
porter of U.S. goods.116 Due to the political chaos, DPW later
agreed to sell its U.S. port operations to AIG Global Investment
111. See generally, Warren G. Lavey, New Regulations for the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States-Disclosures of Cyber Security Plans
and Dealings with Sanctioned Countries Remain Uncertain, 10 BUS. L. INT’L
253 (2009); EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, US NATIONAL
SECURITY AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 123–43 (2006),
http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/3918/05iie3918.pdf; David
McLaughlin, Jonathan D. Salant, & Patrick G. Lee, Lenovo Said to Turn to
U.S. Security Experts to Aid Deals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:41 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-03/lenovo-said-to-turn-to-u-s-
security-experts-to-aid-deals.html.
112. Cox, supra note 91, at 300.
113. Dubai Firm Oks Sale of U.S. Port Contracts, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 12, 2006,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-12-12/news/0612120309_1_dp-world-
aig-global-investment-group-sultan-ahmed-bin-sulayem; Key Questions about
the Dubai Port Deal, CNN (Mar. 6, 2006, 8:15 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/03/06/dubai.ports.qa/index.html?_s=PM:
POLITICS.
114. Key Questions about the Dubai Port Deal, supra note 113.
115. New York Governor George Pataki and Maryland Governor Robert
Ehrlich voiced concerns and stated that they may try to cancel leases at the
ports in their states. 2 Governors Threaten to Void Port Leases, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 21, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-02-
21/news/0602210132_1_dubai-ports-world-united-arab-emirates-state-owned-
business.
116. Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Con-
gressional Involvement is Too Much? 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 344 (2007) (citing
Lauren Etter, Hot Topic: Dubai: Business Partner or Terrorist Hotbed?, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at A9.
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Group on its own accord.117 It is interesting to note that six
weeks after DPW announced the sale of the contested interests,
the Department of Homeland Security announced it would be
checking the names of four hundred thousand longshoremen
and employees of port facilities against terrorist watch lists.118
B. Politically Disputed Transactions that CFIUS Declined to
Review
Currently, CFIUS jurisdiction hinges on traditional notions
of control as defined in corporate law, but fails to address other
forms of control that can undoubtedly raise national security
concerns. Although CFIUS reviews only mergers, acquisitions,
and takeovers, government officials have recognized the au-
thorizing legislation’s weaknesses and have appealed to CFIUS
to evaluate other transactions, such as leases.119 But the scope
of such reviews, as stated in legislation and reinforced by
statements from the agency, establishes that the agency is only
authorized to review transactions that represent an “ownership
transaction,” excluding a simple lease.120
Recently, Republican Congressman Duncan Hunter request-
ed CFIUS to review a thirty-five-year lease of a planned con-
tainer port in Port Canaveral, Florida to UAE-based Gulftain-
er.121 Although Port Canaveral volunteered for review, CFIUS
117. Dubai Firm Oks Sale of U.S. Port Contracts, supra note 113.
118. The Department of Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff,
stated “It is fundamental that individuals who pose a security threat do not
gain access to our nation’s ports.” Meredith Cohn, Baltimore Sun, Port work-
ers’ backgrounds to be screened, Feds to check 400,000 against terrorist lists,
CHI. TRIBUNE (Apr. 26, 2006) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-04-
26/news/0604260105_1_rail-and-pipeline-workers-homeland-security-worker-
checks.
119. Kelly Riddell, Middle Eastern Firm’s Deal to Manage U.S. Cargo Port
Raises Security Concerns, WASH. TIMES, July 29, 2014,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/29/government-oks-arab-
owned-company-operate-us-port/?page=all.
120. Joseph Bonney, Port Canaveral Gets Clearance for Gulftainer Lease,
JOC.COM, (Sept. 26, 2014) http://www.joc.com/port-news/terminal-
operators/port-canaveral-gets-clearance-gulftainer-
lease_20140926.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_cam
pagin=Feed%3A%20joc/aajm%20%28Journal%20of%20Commerce%29.
121. Paul Brinkmann, Congressman seeks review of Port Canaveral-
Gulftainer cargo deal, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 29, 2014),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/brinkmann-on-business/os-
congressman-review-canaveral-gulftainer-cargo-20140729-post.html. Under
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did not further review the lease because the transaction was
not an asset sale, but rather a simple lease.122 Since there was
no ownership transfer, the transaction did not require “further
review on national security grounds.”123 Gulftainer, a “wholly
owned subsidiary of United Arab Emirates based Crescent En-
terprises,”124 will be operating the U.S. terminal, located near
Trident Turning Basin, the site the Navy uses to “support its
fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines,”125 and immediate-
ly south of both the Kennedy Space Center and Cape Canaver-
al Air Force Station.126 The lease is expected to have a signifi-
cant economic impact in favor of Florida, with Gulftainer’s
pledge to hire 95 percent of its staff from Florida.127 Further-
more, it is expected that the new container and cargo terminal
will contribute more than $630 million to Florida’s economy
and $280 million in revenue to Port Canaveral.128
C. Transactions with CFIUS Denial
Although rare, in certain instances the President, at CFIUS’s
recommendation, has chosen to unwind a closed transaction. In
February 2011, CFIUS ordered China’s largest telecom
equipment manufacturer, Huawei Technologies Inc.
(“Huawei”)129 to divest $2 million worth of intellectual property
the lease agreement, Gulftainer will invest $100 million in infrastructure,
equipment, and local human capital. Port Canaveral Signs 35-Rear Agree-
ment with Gulftainer USA, BUSINESSWIRE (June 23, 2014, 12:30 PM),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20140623005959/en/Port-
Canaveral-signs-35-year-agreement-Gulftainer-USA#.VTFx285N3zI.
122. Bonney, supra note 120.
123. Id.
124. Irene Klotz, Mideast Firm to Operate New Cargo Terminal at Port Ca-
naveral, Florida, REUTERS (June 23, 2014, 4:39 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/23/us-usa-florida-port-
idUSKBN0EY2KF20140623.
125. Riddell, supra note 119.
126. Klotz, supra note 124.
127. Brinkmann, supra note 121.
128. In the Spotlight: Gulftainer Expands into USA, GULFTAINER,
http://www.gulftainer.com/about-us/in-the-spotlight-2/ (last visited May 15,
2015).
129. Notably, Huawei was unsuccessful in prior attempts to obtain CFIUS
approval for two different transactions. In 2008, CFIUS refused to permit
Huawei’s investment in U.S. network security firm 3Com. Two years later,
CFIUS again denied approval of an investment in home networking with
2Wire Inc. and Motorola Inc. Failure to obtain CFIUS approval was linked to
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rights it had acquired from 3Leaf, a bankrupt Silicon Valley
startup. 130 Huawei closed the transaction without seeking
CFIUS approval.131 The denial of this transaction exacerbated
both the constant criticism of the politicization of CFIUS and
the reportedly anti-Chinese political and economic climate in
the United States.132 It is interesting to note that in advance of
the purchase, Huawei sought and received approval from the
Bureau of Industry and Security at the Department of Com-
merce.133
Additionally, in recent years, CFIUS has blocked multiple
transactions involving the acquisition of mining interests locat-
ed next to U.S. military bases. First, in 2009, China’s North-
west Non-Ferrous International Company134 failed in its at-
tempts “to acquire a controlling interest in Nevada-based
Firstgold Corporation.”135 Firstgold Corporation (“Firstgold”), a
small publicly traded company, owned “four-mining leases in
Nevada.”136 After submitting notice to CFIUS, the parties to
Huawei’s alleged ties to “China’s military and intelligence agencies.” Vaughn
& Kong, supra note 64.
130. BARFIELD, supra note 19, at 12.
131. Vaughn & Kong, supra note 64.
132. While some argue the deal’s denial motivated China to formalize the
national security review process as “protectionist backlash,” it is equally
plausible that this move was inevitable because such review was contemplat-
ed by Article 31 of China’s Anti-trust law, entitled “Regulation on Implement-
ing of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors.” Saha, supra note 18, at 217 (citing Eco-
nomic Espionage, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/counterintelligence/economic-espionage (last visited May 15,
2015)).
133. The Bureau confirmed that Huawei could export 3Leaf technology
without an export license. Jeremy Zucker & Hrishikesh Hari, Symposium,
Gone With the Wind: The Ralls Transaction and Implications for Foreign In-
vestment in the United States, 8 GLOBAL TRADE&CUSTOMS J. 182, 187 (2013).
134. Northwest Non-Ferrous International Company is controlled by the
Shaanxi provincial government. Matthew C. Sullivan, Mining for Meaning:
Assessing CFIUS’s Rejection of the Firstgold Acquisition, 4 BERKELEY J. INT’L
L. PUBLICIST 12, 15 (2010).
135. Theodore W. Kassinger, Location, Location, Location: Observations on
CFIUS Opposition to Investment by Chinese Mining Company in Firstgold
Corporation, O’MELVENY & MYERS (Jan. 7, 2010),
http://www.omm.com/location-location-location-observations-on-cfius-
opposition-to-investment-by-chinese-mining-company-in-firstgold-
corporation-01-07-2010/.
136. Id.
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the transaction withdrew their notification, terminating the
deal.137 Firstgold disclosed that CFIUS intended to recommend
that President Obama block the transaction and that the
Committee found the transaction presented “serious, signifi-
cant and consequential national security concerns” due to the
“proximity of Firstgold’s properties to the Fallon Naval Air Sta-
tion138 and related facilities.”139 Additionally, while expressing
the company’s disappointment, CEO Terry Lynch stated that
“the Firstgold property lies more than fifty miles from the Fal-
lon base,” and was “surrounded by other mining facilities.”140
Subsequently, in 2012, CFIUS initiated a review for a similar
transaction involving, once again, Firstgold and another Chi-
nese company, Far East Golden Resources Investments Lim-
ited. However, both parties, due to CFIUS’s implementation of
arduous mitigation measures, decided to abandon the transac-
tion.141
Finally, in June 2013, CFIUS once again reviewed a transac-
tion involving properties near Fallon Air Force Base.142 Lincoln
Corporation (“Lincoln”), a Canada-based mining company, en-
gaged in a private placement transaction with Procon, a Chi-
nese state-owned enterprise, and its affiliate, China National
Machinery Industry Corporation.143 The placement transaction
resulted in Procon owning 29 percent of Lincoln’s issued and
outstanding shares, and the power to appoint four of Lincoln’s
seven directors. As in previous transactions, the parties an-
137. Id.
138. Fallon Naval Air Station and the Fallon Range Training Complex are
“the Navy’s premier integrated strike warfare training facilities supporting
present and emerging National Defense Requirements.” Id. Furthermore, it
is home to the TOPGUN flight training school. Daniel B. Pickard, Nova J.
Daily & Usha Neelakantan, CFIUS Forces Chinese Government-Backed
Firms to Divest Interest in Canadian Mining Company With U.S. Operations,
WILEY REIN (June 25, 2013),
http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=8943.
139. Id.
140. Sullivan, supra note 134.
141. Pickard, Daily & Neelakantan, supra note 138.
142. Lincoln also had properties near the Marine Air Corps Station in Yu-
ma, Arizona. CFIUS and Chinese Investment: Lessons Learned from the First
Half of 2013, WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI (Aug. 16, 2013),
https://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFS
earch/wsgralert-CFIUS-and-chinese-investment.htm.
143. As Procon’s affiliate, “China National Machinery Industry indirectly
owns 60% of Procon’s issued and outstanding shares.” Id.
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nounced that they were withdrawing their CFIUS notification
and agreed that “Procon will divest its investment in Lincoln to
a third-party investor subject to review and approval by
CFIUS.”144
The most historic unwinding of a transaction by CFIUS,
which also epitomizes the shortcomings of the CFIUS review
process, occurred in 2012 with the forced breakup of the Ralls
transaction.145 Ralls was mandated by presidential order to di-
vest four Oregon wind farm companies Ralls had previous ac-
quired.146 Ralls, a U.S. company147 incorporated in Delaware, is
owned by the executives of the China-based and closely held
Sany Group Co. (“Sany”).148 Ralls’ owners serve as Sany’s chief
financial officer and general manager.149 In the disputed trans-
action, Ralls acquired wind farms from Terna Energy USA
Holding Corporation, a Delaware Corporation owned by a pub-
licly traded Greek company. 150 In acquiring the companies,
144. Id. (citing Divestment of Procon Investment in Lincoln Mining Required
as a Result of US Regulatory Review, LINCOLN MINING CORP. (June 18, 2013),
http://www.lincolnmining.com/news/index.php?&content_id=255).
145. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 306 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
146. The assets of the acquired companies included: “easements with local
landowners to access their property and construct windfarm turbines . . .
transmission interconnection agreements and agreements for the manage-
ment and use of shared facilities with other nearby windfarms; and necessary
government permits and approvals to construct five windfarms at specific,
approved locations.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d
304 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
147. Despite Ralls being a U.S. corporation, the transaction was subjected
to CFIUS review because Ralls is owned by Chinese nationals. Id. at 301.
148. Sarah Forden & Tom Schoenberg, Chinese-Owned Ralls Corp. Sues
U.S. Over Wind-Farm Order, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-09-13/chinese-owned-ralls-corp-
sues-u-s-over-wind-farm-order.html; Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 304. Sany
Group is an industrial machinery construction company and its main prod-
ucts include: “concrete machinery, excavator [sic], hoisting machinery, pile
driving machinery, road construction machinery, port machinery and wind
turbine [sic].” Corporate Overview, SANY GROUP,
http://www.sanygroup.com/group/en-us/about/group.htm (last visited Feb. 28,
2015).
149. Forden & Schoenberg, supra note 148.
150. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23
(D.D.C. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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Ralls planned to install Chinese-manufactured wind tur-
bines.151
After the transaction had closed, the Navy notified Ralls that
there were concerns pertaining to the location of one wind farm
that was situated within a restricted Naval air space testing
and bombing site.152 Although Ralls addressed the concern by
moving the contested windfarm,153 months later, on June 28,
2013, CFIUS contacted Ralls and invited the corporation to file
a voluntary notice to the Committee.154 Subsequently, Ralls
filed a notice detailing why Ralls maintained that its transac-
tion, “did not pose a national security threat.”155 CFIUS then
initiated a thirty-day review, allowed Ralls to respond to
CFIUS questions, and permitted Ralls to give a presentation.156
On completion of the review period, CFIUS determined that
the acquisition posed a national security threat and, on July
25, 2013, issued an “Order Establishing Interim Mitigation
Measures” in an attempt to mitigate perceived concerns.157
151. Id. at 21.
152. Id. at 78. Ralls alleged in its complaint that Oregon Windfarms had
also developed numerous other windfarm projects in same “general vicinity,”
all of which used foreign-manufactured wind turbines. Ralls also argued that
seven of the windfarms––one of which was owned by a foreign investor––
were located in the restricted airspace. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 305. Previ-
ously, Chinese firms and projects such as “Goldwind’s Shady Oaks Project in
Illinois and Sany’s other wind farm in Texas” had no pushback in their acqui-
sitions. However, these projects were located far from sensitive areas. Ed-
ward Alden & Michael A. Spence, Guest Post: Ralls vs. CFIUS: What Are the
Implications for Chinese Investment?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 5,
2012), http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/10/05/ralls-vs-cfius-what-
are-the-implications-for-chinese-investment/.
153. After Ralls relocated the windfarms, the Navy supported Ralls’ efforts
to obtain new permits from regulators. The Navy expressed no subsequent
concerns about any of the other windfarms outside of the restricted space.
Additionally, Ralls garnered regulatory clearance from the Federal Aviation
Administration that included approval from the Department of Defense prior
to the CFIUS rejection. Zucker & Hari, supra note 133, at 183, (citing
Amended Complaint, Ralls Corp. v. Obama., No. 1:12-cv-01513-ABJ, 2012
WL 4931759 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 2012)).
154. Ralls Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d at 24.
155. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 305.
156. Id.
157. The July order required Ralls to
(1) cease all construction and operations at the Butter Creek project
sites, (2) remove all stockpiled or stored items from the [project sites]
no later than July 30, 2012, and . . . not deposit, stockpile, or store
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Shortly after, on July 30, CFIUS launched an investigation.
On August 2, three days into the investigation, CFIUS issued
an additional “Amended Order Establishing Interim Mitigation
Measures” to remain in effect “until CFIUS concludes action or
the President takes action under section 721 or until express
revocation by CFIUS or the President.”158 After the investiga-
tion ended on September 13, CFIUS submitted its report and
recommendation to President Obama and requested his deci-
sion.159 On September 28, President Obama mandated Ralls
“divest itself of all interests in the Project Companies,” “remove
all items from the project sites,” “cease access to project sites,”
refrain from “selling, transferring or facilitating the sale or
transfer” of any items produced by Sany, and “adhere to re-
striction on the sale of the Project Companies and their assets
to third parties.”160
After the Presidential Order, Ralls brought an action in the
D.C. District Court.161 Ralls challenged both CFIUS and the
Presidential Order on the grounds that the Presidential Order
was an unconstitutional violation of Ralls’ right to equal pro-
tection under the Fifth Amendment and was an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of property without due process.162 The court
dismissed Ralls’ equal protection complaints, but also deter-
mined that the finality clause in Section 721 did not bar judi-
cial review of Ralls’ due process claim, and allowed that portion
of the claim to proceed on the merits.163 Ralls appealed the de-
cision, and on July 15, 2014, the D.C. Circuit reversed and re-
manded the District Court’s decision, holding that the Presi-
any new items at the [project sites] and (3) cease all access to the
project sites.
Ralls Corp., 758 F.2d at 305.
158. Additional mitigation measures “prohibited Ralls from completing any
sale of the Project Companies or their assets without first removing all items
(including concrete foundations) from the Butter Creek project sites, notifying
CFIUS of the sale and giving CFIUS ten business days to object to the sale.”
Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 306.
161. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18
(D.D.C. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign
Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
162. Ralls Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d at 21–22.
163. Id. at 22.
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dential Order did indeed deprive “Ralls of its constitutionally
protected property interests without due process of law.”164
Due to the holding of the D.C. Circuit on appeal, Ralls has
the ability to challenge the Presidential Order. Additionally,
District Court Judge Amy Jackson ordered CFIUS to provide
Ralls with the information that informed President Obama’s
decision to unwind the transaction and, if CFIUS withheld any
material pursuant to executive privilege, the reasons for such
withholding must also be provided.165 Ralls will now have the
opportunity to rebut the information, which would be followed
by another CFIUS recommendation to the President.166 Alt-
hough Judge Jackson’s decision is monumental, it has been
said that “Ralls gets a second bite at the apple, but no one ex-
pects the [P]resident’s order to be reversed.”167 Additionally,
Judge Jackson denied Ralls’ claim that the CFIUS order should
be found moot, due to the fact that Ralls arranged to sell its
acquired property, valued at $6 million, to an undisclosed U.S.
citizen for $50,000—a transaction which CFIUS did not per-
mit.168 Judge Jackson stated that the “unusual circumstances .
. . raise questions about the arm’s length nature of the pro-
posed transaction.”169
III: CURRENT LEGISLATION
In recent years, CFIUS has undergone harsh criticism for not
only biased reviews, but also for its leniency in approving con-
tested transactions.170 CFIUS’s authority, as it stands, is not
narrowly defined. The term “national security” remains unde-
fined, allowing ample room for interpretation. The ambiguous
nature of the term’s definition has arguably led to certain deals
being inadequately evaluated, such as the acquisition of Smith-
164. Ralls Corp., 758 F.3d at 321.
165. Daniel B. Pickard, Nova J. Daly & Usha Neelakantan, Judge Orders
CFIUS to Disclose Unclassified Information to Ralls, WILEY REIN (Nov. 7,
2014), http://www.wileyrein.com/publications.cfm?sp=articles&id=10073.
166. Id.
167. Bien Perez, Ralls Gets Crack at Overturning US Order Blocking its
Wind Farms Deal, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Nov. 12, 2014, 6:39 AM),
http://www.scmp.com/business/china-business/article/1637678/ralls-gets-
crack-overturning-us-order-blocking-its-wind.
168. Rosen, supra note 12.
169. Perez, supra note 167.
170. See generally Jackson, supra note 55.
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field by Shuanghui.171 This approval garnered copious political
opposition by members of the House who thought the transac-
tion greatly implicated the national security of food.172 Such
political uproar has led to new legislative attempts to amend
the CFIUS review process and its scope of authority.
In September 2014, Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro, Demo-
crat from Connecticut, proposed legislation titled “Foreign In-
vestment and Economic Security Act of 2014” (“FIESA”),173 that
would not only radically alter the CFIUS review process, but
drastically extend its scope. The proposed legislation would ex-
pand CFIUS reviews beyond national security to include an
analysis of transactions for a “net benefit” to U.S. interests,
and for “other purposes.”174 Specifically, the legislation would
include an analysis of a transaction’s impact on other im-
portant interests of the nation, including “economic activity,
employment, technology, productivity, public health and safe-
ty.”175 Commentary on the bill stated that it realistically would
not be enacted due to its late introduction into Congress and
controversial scope, but the bill intended to, “revive debate over
the scope of CFIUS review, including whether, when and how
to expand review to factors other than national security.”176
The proposed “net benefit” review of a transaction sweeps in
a multitude of elements for CFIUS’s consideration. These ele-
ments include, first, “the effect on the level of economic activi-
171. Id. at 11–12.
172. Parija Kavilanz, Is Pork a National Security Asset?, CNNMONEY (May
31, 2013, 9:51 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/31/news/companies/smithfield-
foods/index.html.
173. H.R. 5581, 113th Cong. §1 (2014). On September 18, 2014, the legisla-
tion was introduced in the House and referred to the House Committee on
Financial Services. H.R.5581 – Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act
of 2014, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-
bill/5581/actions (last visited Sept. 28, 2015).
174. DeLauro Introduces Foreign Investment and Economic Security Act of
2014, CONGRESSWOMAN ROSA DELAURO,
http://delauro.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=17
03:delauro-introduces-foreign-investment-and-economic-security-act-of-
2014&catid=2:press-releases&Itemid=21 (last visited May 15, 2015).
175. H.R. 5581 § 3(o)(1)(A)–(B).
176. Christopher Brewster, DeLauro Legislation Would Broaden Reach of
CFIUS Reviews, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2014, 10:28 AM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/580422/delauro-legislation-would-broaden-
reach-of-cfius-reviews.
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ty177 in the United States.”178 Second, if a transaction is influ-
enced by a foreign government, the Committee must consider
the “governance and commercial orientation of the foreign per-
son,” how and to what extent the foreign person involved in a
transaction is owned, controlled or influenced by a foreign gov-
ernment, and the applicable state government’s policies regard-
ing support and the economic sector. 179 The legislation also
compels CFIUS to consider whether the foreign person “ad-
heres to United States standards of corporate governance,” and
whether the home country is “adequately engaged with the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board.”180
Finally, the legislation proposes that CFIUS review transac-
tions of any “construction of a new facility in the United States
by any foreign person,” regardless of whether the underlying
investment entailed a merger, acquisition or takeover.181 In ad-
dition to these substantive changes, the legislation also pro-
vides for new procedural protections for parties to a transac-
tion. Unlike Section 721, FIESA includes a right to appeal a
final determination. 182 If parties wish to appeal, they may
submit additional information in the thirty days after a deter-
mination is rendered to prove their transaction will provide a
“net benefit” to the United States.183
177. Analysis on “economic activity” includes “the level and the quality of
employment; resource processing; the utilization of parts and services pro-
duced in the United States; the utilization of products, parts, and services
imported into the United States; and exports from the United States.” H.R.
5581 § 3(o)(1)(A)(i)–(v) (2014). Additionally, the review will consider the
effect of the proposed or pending transaction on productivity, indus-
trial efficiency, technological development, technology transfers, and
production innovation in the United States; the effect of the proposed
or pending transaction on competition within any industry in the
United States or between the United States and other countries; the
compatibility of the proposed or pending transaction with national
industrial, economic, and cultural policies; the effect on the public
health, safety, well-being of United States consumers.
H.R. 5581 § 3 (o)(B)–(F) (2014).
178. H.R. 5581 § 3(o)(1)(A)(i)–(v).
179. H.R. 5581 § 3(o)(1)(F)(i)–(ii).
180. H.R. 5581 § 3(o)(1)(F)(iii)(I)–(III).
181. Brewster, supra note 176.
182. H.R. 5581 § 3(o)(3)(A).
183. Id.
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Additional legislation concerning CFIUS has also been an-
nounced by another vocal opponent of the Shuanghui transac-
tion,184 the Chairwoman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Agri-
culture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Debbie Stabenow, Democrat
from Michigan. Senator Stabenow announced that legislation is
being drafted to “overhaul the American government’s review
process for foreign acquisitions.”185 Like Congresswoman De-
Lauro, Senator Stabenow emphasizes that “the government’s
review process for foreign acquisitions of American companies”
must account for “the impact that the purchase could have on a
broad array of national priorities and interests.” 186 Senator
Stabenow also implies that the Committee should move beyond
CFUIS’s original, narrowly-focused purpose of preserving na-
tional security, to evaluating other interests such as the eco-
nomic and cultural ramifications on the nation.187
PART IV: CHINA AND ITS REGULATORY REGIME FOR INBOUND
FDI
In recent years, there has been a global “proliferation of mer-
ger control regimes.”188 The enforcement of such regimes has
been deeply problematic.189 Although these regimes are gov-
erned by organizations or agreements such as the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), 190 the North America Free Trade
184. See supra Part II.A.
185. Brewster, supra note 176.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Denise Wee, Regulatory Hurdles a Rising Concern for Asia M&A, FIN.
ASIA (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.financeasia.com/News/392557,regulatory-
hurdles-a-rising-concern-for-asia-ma.aspx.
189. Id. In July 2015, lawmakers in South Korea proposed a bill “to revise
the Foreign Investment Promotion Act” to prohibit the sale of Korean compa-
nies if such sale would be “detrimental to the overall Korean economy.” Jeong
Hunny, NPAD Seeks Tighter Rules on Speculative Foreign Investors, KOREA
HERALD (July 7, 2015),
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150706000767.
190. Although the WTO and its provisions are at issue, it is often noted that
foreign investors lack effective recourse in organizations like the WTO due to
the fear of economic and political blowback for speaking out against Chinese
regulatory authorities and policies. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:
IMPACT ON MARKET ACCESS, NATIONAL TREATMENT AND TRANSPARENCY, 2
(2012) [hereinafter CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI],
http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/4b417f2b-ca02-4c23-b5a0-
1062 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 40:3
Agreement (“NAFTA”),191 or bilateral and multilateral invest-
ment treaties, these governing bodies typically allow depar-
tures from obligations for national security risks.192 As a result,
international merger control regimes remain ambiguous,
vague, and difficult to navigate. Countries such as India, Ger-
many, and, most significantly, China, have created or threat-
ened to create regulatory regimes in response to the CFIUS re-
views.193 Retaliatory legislation in response to a disapproved
transaction by the United States was instituted by China in
2011,194 wherein China codified its own national security re-
view framework, mirroring that of CFIUS.195
Contemporary transactions involving foreign persons domi-
ciled in China appear to be the epicenter of disputes surround-
ing CFIUS reviews.196 China remains in the spotlight due to its
c9882f8f02ac/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/74c43d19-71c2-47c5-b6ce-
ccb56c56d91b/China_InboundInvestment.pdf.
191. Article 2102 of NAFTA provides the following exception for national
security concerns:
Subject to Articles 607 and 1018, nothing in this agreement shall be
construed (a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any
information the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to
its essential security interests; (b) to prevent any Party from taking
any actions that it considers necessary for the protection of its essen-
tial security interests.
North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 2102, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057.
192. Zaring, supra note 60, at 127.
193. Id. at 86.
194. See supra Part II.C. See also Saha, supra note 18, at 217 (“[T]he tem-
poral proximity of the Security Review Notice to the adverse CFIUS review of
the Huawei-3Leaf transaction suggests protectionist backlash.”).
195. Id.
196. See generally David McLaughlin & Sangwon Yoon, Waldorf Sale to
Chinese Risks Review Over Spying Concerns, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2014, 11:36
AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-07/waldorf-sale-to-chinese-
risks-review-over-spying-concerns.html. Recently, the purchase of New York’s
Waldorf Astoria hotel by Anbang Insurance Company of China has once
again prompted the discussion of CFIUS’s focus on Chinese investments. The
Waldorf Astoria serves as the “home away from home” for U.S. presidents
visiting New York City and is the residence of the U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations. Mark Katz, Sale of Landmark NYC Hotel an Example of
What Triggers Canadian, U.S. National Security Protocols, LAWS. WKLY.,
Apr. 3, 2015, http://www.lawyersweekly.ca/articles/2354. State Department
officials have stated that President Obama cancelled the “longstanding White
House reservation at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel” and that the White House
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position as one of the world’s leading economies.197 Additional-
ly, these blockbuster reviews involve high-dollar transactions,
are often prolonged, and face aggressive political pressure.198
Although fears of Chinese-cultivated espionage materialized
with the Justice Department’s indictment of five officers in
China’s People’s Liberation Army for attempts to steal U.S.
commercial trade secrets, the integrity of the CFIUS review
process continues to be debated.199
Further, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Exec-
utive has previously stated that China, through its use of cor-
porate insiders and sophisticated hacking, has been at the fore-
front of “foreign economic collection and industrial espionage
activities against major [U.S.] corporations.”200 Although politi-
cal commentators, economists, foreign investors, and scholars
critique CFIUS for administering politicized and thus ineffec-
tive reviews, recent empirical and statistical data suggest that
such commentary is unfounded.201 A majority of the Chinese
investments in the United States are approved without issue;
instead booked rooms at the New York Palace Hotel. The New York Palace
Hotel was recently purchased by a consortium in South Korea. Pamela Falk,
Obama Nixing 8 Decades of Tradition to Spite China?, CBS NEWS (July 23,
2015) http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-white-house-out-of-waldorf-
astoria-hotel-chinese-anbang-purchase/.
197. China Surpasses U.S. to Become Largest World Economy, FOX NEWS
(Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/12/06/china-surpasses-us-
to-become-largest-world-economy/.
198. See supra Part II.
199. Charles Cooper, Behind US-China Cyberspy Tensions: The View from
Beijing (Q&A), CNET (June 5, 2014, 4:00 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/news/behind-us-china-cyberspy-tensions-the-view-from-
beijing/.
200. Saha, supra note 18, at 207 (citing OFFICE OF THE NAT’L
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., FOREIGN SPIES STEALING US ECONOMIC SECRETS
IN CYBERSPACE (Comm. Print 2011),
http://www.ncsc.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collecti
on_2011.pdf).
201. A recent empirical study stated that the regression analysis “indicates
that CFIUS decisions appear to be non-discriminatory. National security fac-
tors such as risk of espionage explain the review outcomes better than favor-
itism towards certain countries of origin alone.” It is important to note that
the regression analysis focused on discrimination in CFIUS review outcomes
rather than preliminary application of CFIUS review. Connell & Huang, su-
pra note 40, at 135, 160.
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there is no indication that Chinese companies are “formally
discriminated against.”202
In 2014, Chinese direct investment into the United States
surpassed U.S. direct investment into China.203 China, never-
theless, is not the predominant source of FDI in the United
States.204 Rather, the top nine sources that account for 80 per-
cent of FDI in the United States include the United Kingdom,
Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, France, Switzerland, Luxem-
bourg, Germany, and Belgium.205 While China accounts for less
than 1 percent of FDI in the United States,206 it is the fastest
growing source for FDI in both the United States and the rest
of the international community.207 With this economic back-
202. Barfield, supra note 19, at 15.
203. John Kehoe, Chinese Investment in US Surpasses American Investment
in China, FIN. REV., Apr. 30, 2014,
http://www.afr.com/p/world/chinese_investment_in_us_surpasses_kJuD3wyyt
WpR6Fb7QuxuYJ; Daniel H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, New Realities in the
US-China Investment Relationship, RHODIUM GROUP (Apr. 19, 2014),
http://rhg.com/notes/new-realities-in-the-us-china-investment-relationship;
U.S. CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION, 113TH CONG., 2D
SESS., 2014 REPORT TOCONGRESS 34 (2014).
204. Id. at 90.
205. Id.
206. Jason Lange, China Investors Top U.S. List of 2013 National Security
Reviews, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2015, 5:50 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/26/us-usa-china-
idUSKBN0LU2HZ20150226. According to Rhodium Group, in the last quar-
ter of 2014,
Chinese firms spent $3.7 billion on 30 FDI transactions in the US,
bringing total Chinese investment for last year to nearly $12 billion.
. . . A strong base for 2015 is expected with more than $3 billion in
deals currently up in the air and several large, multiyear greenfield
projects in real estate and other sectors started last year.
Hua Shengdun, China Top Attendee at Investment Summit, CHINADAILYUSA
(Mar. 13, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://usa.chinadaily.com/cn/us/2015-
03/13/content_19807665.htm.
207. Toh Han Shih, Slow Going Seen for China-US Investment Treaty due
to Political Delays, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 15, 2014,
http://www.scmp.com/business/economy/article/1662812/slow-going-seen-
china-us-investment-treaty-due-political-delays. Data released by the U.S.
Department of Commerce indicated that “China’s direct investment in the US
grew by a compound annual rate of 41.51 percent between 2009 and 2013.”
Foreign Investment Growth in US Led by China, WANTCHINA TIMES (Mar. 25,
2015, 10:42 AM), http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-print-
cnt.aspx?id=20150325000046&cid=1202&MainCatID=12. China invested
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ground in mind, generally the amount of FDI is directly propor-
tional to the frequency of CFIUS reviews. However, these sta-
tistics are subject to the rising and diminishing prominence of
certain markets.208 Between 2011 and 2013, the countries en-
during the most reviews were China (54 reviews), the United
Kingdom (49 reviews), Canada (34 reviews), Japan (34 re-
views), and France (29 reviews).209 However, in looking at 2013
alone, transactions involving China received the most atten-
tion, with 21 reviews, followed by Japan, with 18 reviews.210
A. Development of China’s National Security Review Regulatory
Regime
China, in liberalizing its economy, has gradually opened its
borders to foreign parties.211 Since this economic expansion on-
ly began in 1983, China’s regulatory regime, in both its for-
mation and practice, remains in its infancy.212 However, like
more than $12.6 billion in Europe in 2012, making Europe the principle re-
cipient of foreign investment by Chinese firms. This is reportedly due to the
fact that Europe has welcomed Chinese investments because of the conti-
nent’s recession, while the United States resists Chinese investments as a
result of suspicions of threats. Claus Hecking, Capital Study: Chinese In-
vestment in Europe Hits Record High, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 16, 2013, 12:16
PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/study-finds-massive-
investment-in-europe-by-chinese-state-companies-a-894570.html.
208. See supra Part I.C.
209. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS CY 2013, supra note 72, at 17.
210. Id.
211. Foreign Direct Investment-the China Story, THEWORLD BANK, (July 16,
2010), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/07/16/foreign-direct-
investment-china-story.print.
212. Saha, supra note 18, at 215. On January 19, 2015, MOFCOM pub-
lished the draft of its new Foreign Investment Law for public comment. The
draft, when finalized, “unifies and repeals three current foreign-invested en-
terprise (FIE) laws: the PRC Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law (Re-
vised), the PRC Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (2nd Revision) and
the PRC Sino-foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law (Revised), which govern
the corporate structures of foreign entities in China.” Katherine Jo, China
Revamps Foreign Investment Rules, Tackles VIEs, CHINA L. & PRACTICE (Jan.
30, 2015),
http://www.chinalawandpractice.com/Article/3433178/Channel/9933/China-
revamps-foreign-investment-rules-tackles-VIEs.html. The draft’s main pur-
pose is to “grant ‘national treatment’ to all foreign investment, except that
which falls under the ‘Special Administrative Measure List’ (‘Negative List’).”
The draft includes a national security review process that employs similar
elements to the CFIUS review process. However, all administrative decisions
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CFIUS, China’s legislation pertaining to national security re-
views (“NSRs”) for FDI has promulgated over time. In 2008,
will be “exempt from any judicial review.” Norman B. Page, Ron Cai & Chao
Tong, Draft of China’s New Foreign Investment Law, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 29,
2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ddb5907e-b45c-4f4c-
b8b1-f4cedf78a711. This proposed legislation will simply “formalize the na-
tional security review principles that were already in place and in practice.”
China’s New Foreign Investment Law: Implications for Restricted Industry
Investments in China, CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT (Mar. 13, 2015),
http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/chinas-new-
foreign-investment-law-implications-for-restricted-industry-investments-in-
china. Additionally, the draft law “intends to consolidate the existing laws
regulating foreign investments into one uniform statutory regime and unify
the corporate legal requirements for both foreign and domestic investments
in China.” CHRISTOPHER W. BETTS ET AL., SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGER &
FLOM, CHINA’S MOFCOM AIMS TO FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS 1 (2015),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/China’s%20MOFCO
M%20Aims%20to%20Fundamentally%20Change%20the%20Legal%20Landsc
ape%20on%20Foreign%20Investments.pdf. While this will potentially alter
the framework of foreign investment law and the national security review
framework, this draft law does not affect this Note’s analysis. This Note ana-
lyzes the national security review scheme specific to mergers and acquisi-
tions, rather than foreign investment generally. These specific national secu-
rity review schemes include: Shāngwù bù duì ānquán shěnchá zhìdù de
bìnggòu jìngnèi qǐyè de wàiguó tóuzī zhě shíshī guiding (商务部实施外国投资
者并购境内企业安全审查制度的规定) [Provisions of the Ministry of Commerce
on the Implementation of the Security Review System for Mergers and Ac-
quisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 25, 2011, effective Sept. 1, 2011) 53 MINISTRY OF
COMMERCE ANNOUNCEMENT (China) [hereinafter Provisions on Implementa-
tion of Security Review System]; Shāngwù bù yǒuguān wèntí de zhàn háng
guīdìng xiāngguān de ānquán shěnchá zhìdù bìnggòu jìngnèi qǐyè de wàiguó
tóuzī zhě bìnggòu shíshī (商务部有关问题的暂行规定相关的安全审查制度并购境
内企业的外国投资者并购实施) [Interim Provisions of the Ministry of Com-
merce on Issues Related to the Implementation of the Security Review Sys-
tem for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Inves-
tors], No.8 (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Mar. 4, 2011, effective
Mar. 5, 2011, Repealed) 8 MINISTRY OF COMMERCE ANNOUNCEMENT (China)
[hereinafter Interim Provisions on Issues Related to Implementation];
Guówùyuàn bàngōng tīng guānyú kāizhǎn ānquán shěnchá zhìdù de bìnggòu
jìngnèi qǐyè de bìnggòu wàiguó tóuzī zhě de tōngzhī (国务院办公厅关于建立外
国投资者并购境内企业安全审查制度的通知) [Notice of the General Office of the
State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers and
Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors] (promulgated by
the General Office of the State Council, Feb. 3, 2011, effective March 5, 2011)
6 GUO BAN FA (China) [hereinafter Notice on Launching Security Review Sys-
tem].
2015] From China With Love 1067
China first attempted to adopt a NSR for foreign mergers and
acquisitions with the creation of China’s anti-monopoly law.213
Article 31 of the primarily antitrust review legislation provided
for a concurrent NSR,214 similar to other national security pro-
visions found in free market economies.215 Later in 2011, the
NSR process was formalized when MOFCOM issued new “Pro-
visions of the Ministry of Commerce on the Implementation of
the Security Review System for the Merger and Acquisition of
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors” (“Chinese Model”),
CFIUS’s Chinese counterpart.216
B. Comparison of Chinese and U.S. National Security Reviews
China’s and the United States’ NSR schemes illustrate the
difficulties nations face in striking a balance between policies
that encourage FDI while also protecting national security.
Comparing China’s and the United States’217 NSR schemes fur-
ther demonstrates the two nations’ complex political relation-
ships. Procedurally, the Chinese Model for NSR directly mir-
rors CFIUS review in several aspects. First, China has an in-
teragency panel218 known as the “ministerial panel” that con-
213. Zhōngguó rénmín gònghéguó fǎn lǒngduàn fǎ (中华人民共和国反垄)
[Anti-monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008)
2011 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (China).
214. Id. art. 31 (“Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a domestic
enterprise or participates in concentration by other means, if state security is
involved, besides the examination of the concentration in accordance with
this Law, the examination of national security shall also be conducted in ac-
cordance with the relevant State provisions.”).
215. Kenneth Y. Hui, National Security Review of Foreign Mergers and Ac-
quisitions of Domestic Companies in China and the United States 1–2 (Cor-
nell Law Sch. Inter-University Graduate Student Conf., Paper No. 34, Apr.
14, 2009).
216. Provisions on Implementation of Security Review System, supra note
212.
217. Foreign investments in the United States are subject to fewer pre-
establishment approvals. Foreign investments in the United States are, at
most, subject to “anti-monopoly review, national security review, enterprise
registration, site-related and environmental approvals, industry regulatory
approvals, and approvals related to strategic investments in publicly traded
companies.” CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI, supra note 190, at
42.
218. Leadership of the national security review includes the National De-
velopment and Reform Commission and MOFCOM. Christine Kahler, For-
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ducts the reviews.219 As in the United States and other jurisdic-
tions that employ similar rules, the Chinese Model gives the
Chinese government great discretion on NSR.220 Second, for-
eign investors may voluntarily file with MOFCOM or the local
commerce authorities and other government agencies may re-
quest a filing.221 Third, the Chinese Model proceeds with an
articulated, multi-stage timeline, which provides for mitigation
measures and allows parties to a transaction to withdraw their
application for review.222
C. NSR in the United States and China: Scope and Procedure
Even though the Chinese Model and CFIUS are similar in
their procedures, the two regimes are incredibly different sub-
stantively. It is first important to note that China’s overall ap-
proval process for inbound FDI, aside from the NSR, is much
more comprehensive than the process in the United States. The
Chinese Model provides for “far greater avenues and opportu-
nities to scrutinize foreign mergers and acquisitions through
the national security review process.”223 Specifically, the Chi-
nese Model’s scope of review, in respect to sectors and types of
transactions, is much broader. Many components overlap, in-
cluding the review of mergers and transaction by foreign inves-
tors if an investor would “obtain actual control” or de facto con-
trol224 of a domestic enterprise involving the military, military
eign M&A in China Face Security Review, CHINA BUS. REV., Apr. 1, 2011,
http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/foreign-ma-in-china-face-security-
review/.
219. CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI, supra note 190, at 12.
220. China’s New National Security Review Will Examine Foreign Invest-
ment in Chinese Companies, JONES DAY (Feb. 2011),
http://www.jonesday.com/china_new_national_security_review/.
221. CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI, supra note 190, at 12.
222. Provisions on Implementation of Security Review System, supra note
212; Notice on Launching Security Review System, supra note 212.
223. Saha, supra note 18, at 218.
224. In the Chinese Model, de facto control is established when a
foreign investor becom[es] a controlling shareholder or de facto con-
troller of the Chinese enterprise in a M&A action that includes: con-
trolling parent company or controlled subsidiary taking more than
50% of equity interests of merged or acquired enterprise, several for-
eign investors cumulatively taking more than 50% of equity interests
of the merged or acquired enterprise, a foreign investor has a major
influence over decisions of SH meetings or board of directors of
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support or association with national defense and security, in-
frastructure, energy, equipment manufacturing, technology, or
transportation. 225 Additionally, transactions are reviewed if
they are specifically in the vicinity of sensitive military facili-
ties.226 Novel additions to the inquiry provide for the considera-
tion of more economic and cultural considerations. Specifically,
unique considerations include “the effect on the stability of the
national economy, on basic social order, and on research and
development capabilities for key national technologies.”227
The most striking difference between the two regimes, which
highlights precarious loopholes in the U.S. legislation, is the
Chinese Model’s authority to review additional transactions
outside the specified mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers. The
Chinese Model stipulates an additional approval process for
post-establishment expansion or modifications of the enter-
prise.228 Expansions or modifications can include a change of
registered capital or shareholders, amendments of a business’s
operational scope, acquisition of a “company in a restricted in-
merged or acquired enterprise even if they acquire less than 50% of
the merged or acquired enterprise, or a foreign investor taking de
facto control over business decision-making, finance, human resource
or technology of the merged or acquired Chinese enterprise.
China Formalizes National Security Review System for M&A Transactions by
Foreign Investors, MWE CHINA L. OFFICES,
http://www.mwechinalaw.com/news/2011/chinalawalert0911c.htm (last visit-
ed Sept. 15, 2015).
225. Notice on Launching the Security Review System, supra note 212, pa-
ra. 1. This list includes the previously established nine “pillar industries”
announced in 2006, in which “state-owned enterprises should play a leading
role: auto, chemical, construction, electronic information, heavy equipment
manufacturing, nonferrous metal, research and development (R&D), steel,
and technology.” Kahler, supra note 218.
226. Notice on Launching the Security Review, supra note 212, para. 1;
Kahler, supra note 218.
227. China’s New National Security Review Will Examine Foreign Invest-
ment in Chinese Companies, supra note 220. Such areas of inquiry have been
categorized as either “economic security” or “cultural security.” Kevin B.
Goldstein, Reviewing Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions for Competition
and National Security: A Comparative Look at How the United States, Eu-
rope, and China Separate Security Concerns from Competition Concerns in
Reviewing Acquisitions by Foreign Entities, 3 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 215,
238 (2011) (citing Tarrant M. Mahony, Thirty Years of Reform and Opening:
A Brief History of Foreign Investment in China, 1 DONG-A J. INT’L BUS.
TRANSACTIONS L. 1, 36–37 (2009).
228. CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI, supra note 190, at 20.
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dustry,” and an expansion of business presence by “adding new
products or opening new branches.”229 Furthermore, the final
NSR Rules, in contrast to the Interim Rules,230 exhibit a critical
change in China’s approach to NSR. Specifically, as articulated
in Article 9:
Whether a foreign investor’s M&A of a domestic enterprise
falls within the scope of M&A security review or not shall be
determined based on the substance and actual influence of
the M&A transaction. No foreign investor is allowed to sub-
stantially avoid the M&A security review in any way, includ-
ing but not limited to, holding shares on behalf of others,
trust, multi-level reinvestment, leasing, loans, variable inter-
est entities, or overseas transactions.231
As a result, the Chinese Model substantially eliminates the
ability of foreign entities to circumvent a NSR due to the em-
phasis on the “the substance and the actual impact” of a trans-
action and the explicit acknowledgment that alternative struc-
tures to a transaction cannot be used to thwart reviews.232
D. Critiques of the NSR Models
As CFIUS and the Chinese Model are similar in structure, so
are the criticisms leveled at them. First, both regulatory
schemes are critiqued for the vague definition of “national se-
curity,” which allows for a potentially arbitrary review pro-
cess.233 Second, investors have voiced concerns that both NSRs
are generally vague.234 Ambiguities in the NSR process, partic-
229. Id.
230. Interim Provisions on Issues Related to Implementation, supra note
212.
231. Provisions on Implementation Security Review System, supra note
212.
232. Alert Memo: MOFCOM Issues Final National Security Review Rules,
CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Sept. 19, 2011), http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/31760287-
9ae4-4499-9f9f-20e84ba6d576/Presentation/NewsAttachment/5d0747e0-df96-
46b9-9a9d-21da85fc0871/CGSH%20Alert%20-
%20MOFCOM%20Issues%20Final%20National%20Security%20Review%20R
ules.pdf [hereinafter Alert Memo].
233. See generally Amy S. Josselyn, National Security at All Costs: Why the
CFIUS Review Process May Have Overreached its Purpose, 21 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 1347, 1374, 1379 (2014); Goldstein, supra note 227, at 227.
234. See generally Cooper, supra note 199; Susan Ning, Huang Jing & Yin
Ranran, Updated National Security Review Rules: A Justifiable Cause of Anx-
iety, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Sept. 5, 2011),
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ularly in the Chinese Model, highlight the possibility that Chi-
na is violating WTO commitments, and the resulting lack of
disclosure and paper trail have impaired enforcement of both
nations’ WTO commitments. 235 Such difficulties enable both
China and the United States to favor domestic enterprises over
foreign competitors. However, as of 2012, foreign investors’ ex-
perience with China’s NSR has been minimal. Therefore, cri-
tiques of the Chinese Model have focused not on implementa-
tion but instead ambiguities in the law itself.
PART V: SUGGESTIONS FOR REVIEW
Revisions to the CFIUS process must be considered in the
context of the current economic and political climate, as well as
the existing regulatory framework for FDI into the United
States. 236 Amendments must consider existing bilateral in-
vestment treaties with other countries, including China,237 the
http://www.chinalawinsight.com/2011/09/articles/corporate/updated-national-
security-review-rules-a-justifiable-cause-of-anxiety/.
235. CHINA’S APPROVAL PROCESS FOR INBOUND FDI, supra note 190, at 35.
236. On November 24, 2014, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis reinstated previously discontinued mandatory reporting re-
quirements of the BE-13 Survey of New FDI in the United States. The survey
collects statistical data concerning the “acquisition or establishment of U.S.
business enterprises by foreign investors” and “information on expansions by
existing U.S. affiliates of foreign companies.” Neil Ray & Curtis M. Dombek,
Mandatory Reporting of Foreign Direct Investments in the U.S., NAT’L L. REV.
(Dec. 21, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/mandatory-reporting-
foreign-direct-investments-us; Jeanne S. Archibald, Anthony V. Capobianco,
Aleksandar Dukic, Ajay Kuntamukkala, Robert D. Kyle & Beth Peters,
Commerce Department Reinstates Mandatory Reporting Requirements for
Certain Foreign Direct Investments in U.S. Companies and Real Estate,
LEXOLOGY (Dec. 29, 2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=07a4904d-df1b-415a-90e5-
060288a00aa8.
237. In July 2013, at the close of the fifth United States-China Strategic
and Economic Dialogue, China and the United States announced their inten-
tion to negotiate a bilateral investment treaty (a “BIT”) covering “all stages of
investment and sectors.” These negotiations made significant inroads into
opening up China’s previously secluded economy to U.S. investment. Most
importantly, these negotiations mark the first time that “China has agreed to
negotiate a BIT that includes all stages of investment and sectors.” Betsy
Bourassa, Treasury Notes, U.S. and China Breakthrough Announcement on
the Bilateral Investment Treaty Negotiations, U.S. DEP’T. TREASURY (July 15,
2013), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/U.S.-and-China-
Breakthrough-Announcement-.aspx. Additionally, during BIT negotiations,
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intentions of U.S. foreign trade policies like those articulated in
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit,238 and the rise
of China as the fastest growing source of FDI in both the Unit-
ed States and the world.239 In addition to addressing domestic
concerns, amendments must also assure foreign investors that
a revised FDI regulatory framework is impartial and unbiased.
Thus, a balance between maintaining national security, while
not discouraging FDI with a nebulous body of law, must be
struck.
A. Maintaining a Permissive Definition of “National Security”
Contrary to the suggestions of recent scholarship and pro-
posed legislation, the term “national security” must not be ex-
plicitly defined. Even though commentators suggest a need for
a definition that expands CFIUS’s scope of power or increases
the Committee’s transparency to foreign investors,240 providing
a concrete definition inhibits CFIUS’s ability to adapt to new
forms of industrial espionage. Such fixed definitions would like-
ly overlook nuanced threats in the current era of globalization
and compromise the nation’s security. In order to properly
maintain national security within the United States, the defi-
nition of “national security” should not be concretely defined.
Instead, “national security” should remain a broad term, in or-
der to best grapple with unexpected issues. As seen in
Chinese negotiators explicitly asked for clarification and transparency in the
review process. Sean Miner, China-U.S. Investment Treaty Would Strengthen
Economic Relations, CAIXIN ONLINE (Nov. 11, 2014, 3:56 PM),
http://english.caixin.com/2014-11-21/100754012.html.
238. During the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Beijing in
November 2014, the United States and China discussed a treaty that would
boost investment between the two nations. China also indicated that it was
allowing “foreign investment in all sectors of its economy, except those on the
‘negative list.’” The basic text of the treaty is purported to be completed by
the end of 2014 while negotiations on specific sectors for investment will con-
tinue to be deliberated in 2015. Shih, supra note 207. Additionally, in June
2015, China and the United States reached an “important milestone” in the
exchange of the countries initial offers of their “negative lists.” Xinhua Zhu
Junqing, Spotlight: China, U.S. pin high hopes on Xi’s visit for Breakthrough
in BIT Talks, INT’L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES–CHINA (Sept. 19, 2015, 2:00
PM), http://www.iiss.com/html/article/20159/20/a313b.html.
239. Shih, supra note 207.
240. See Amy S. Josselyn, supra note 233, at 1374 & 1379; H.R. 5581, 113th
Cong. (2014).
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§ 2170(f), ten of the eleven factors the Committee considers are
explicitly focused on inquiries concerning national security.241
Additionally, the definition of “national security” must not be
specifically defined to include “economic security” or a “net
benefit” review.242 Including “economic security” as part of the
national security inquiry would insert a political factor into
CFIUS’s jurisdiction and thus politicize the review process.
Although CFIUS, in both its structure and history, often ap-
pears to conflate national security with economic security, it is
important to note that national and economic security are often
tightly intertwined. This close relationship is proven by
CFIUS’s intimate relationship with the Department of the
Treasury and due to CFIUS’s jurisdiction hinging on the type
of economic transaction.243 Although the economic security of
the nation is critical, economic security should not eclipse the
foundational concern of CFIUS—national security.244
If the substance of CFIUS national security inquiries were
amended to include a “net benefit” review, as proposed in Con-
gresswoman DeLauro’s legislation, the analysis would become
even more politicized because subsequent evaluations would
range into more politically-debated national issues.245 Topics
such as “economic activity,” “quality of employment,” the effect
on productivity, “industrial efficiency,” and compatibility with
“U.S. cultural policies”246 would lead to drastic politicization of
the review process. These issues would also divert CFIUS’s fo-
cus from its already burdensome task of protecting national
security. Furthermore, a substantive expansion of the national
security inquiry would not only discourage FDI, but would
241. 50 U.S.C. app § 2170(f) (2007).
242. H.R. 5581.
243. Composition of CFIUS, DEP’T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010); Foreign
Investment and National Security Act, sec. 2, Pub. L. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246,
246 (2007).
244. During the Hearing on CFIUS and the Role of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment in the United States, Daniel K. Tarullo stated, “There is widespread
agreement, verging on consensus, that two important interests are implicated
by Section 721. One, of course, is protection of the national security. The oth-
er is the nation’s economic interest in receiving foreign direct investment.”
Hearing, supra note 31, at 60.
245. See supra Part III.
246. Brewster, supra note 176.
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make the CFIUS judgments more arbitrary and politicized due
to the critical lack of a framework for determining what consti-
tutes a “net benefit.” Finally, as seen in the Chinese Model,
which arguably violates China’s WTO commitments, adding
such stipulations could possibly violate the United States’
commitments247 to the WTO.248
B. Defining “Covered Transactions” to Include Alternative
Types of “Control”
Rather than explicitly defining “national security” or broad-
ening the substance of CFIUS reviews, the definition of “cov-
ered transaction[s]” must be broadened to include transactions
in which a foreign person could gain “de facto”249 control of a
U.S. business. Presently, section 800.224 defines and therefore
establishes the statutory requirement that a “transaction”
must be a “proposed or completed merger, acquisition, or take-
over.”250 Additionally, section 800.207 defines a “covered trans-
247. See United States of America and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/usa_e.htm (last visited May
17, 2015).
248. See supra Part IV.
249. De facto is defined as “actual,” “existing in fact,” or “having effect even
though not formally or legally recognized.” De facto, BLACK’S LAWDICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
250. 31 C.F.R. § 800.224 (2004). The regulation specifically includes the
following transactions:
(a) The acquisition of an ownership interest in an entity. (b) The ac-
quisition or conversion of convertible voting instruments of an entity.
(c) The acquisition of proxies from holders of a voting interest in an
entity. (d) A merger or consolidation. (e) The Formation of a joint
venture. (f) a long-term lease under which a lessee makes substan-
tially all business decisions concerning the operation of a leased enti-
ty, as if it were the owner.
Id. Additionally, noncovered transactions include:
(a) A stock split or pro rata stock dividend that does not involve a
change in control. (b) A transaction that results in a foreign person
holding ten percent or less of the outstanding voting interest in a
U.S. business . . . but only if the transaction is solely for the purpose
of passive investment. (c) An acquisition of any part of an entity or
assets, if such part of an entity or assets do not constitute a U.S.
business.
31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (2010).
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action”251 as “any transaction . . . by or with any foreign person,
which could result in control252 of a U.S. business by a foreign
person.”253 Furthermore, section 800.302 outlines transactions
that are exempt from the “covered transactions” definition, in-
cluding transactions or events that affect ownership, but do not
constitute a change of control in an entity.254 Thus, establishing
a transfer in control is a key threshold issue, because CFIUS’s
jurisdiction is predicated on control.
On their face, sections 800.204, 800.207, 800.302, and
800.224 appear extremely detailed in defining terms and
providing examples. They address very nuanced components
regarding what is considered to be a transaction in addition to
the subelements of transactions that create control. Namely,
the definitions identify elements of corporate structure that in-
clude corporate governance, securities, and shareholders’ vot-
ing rights. However, basing CFIUS jurisdiction on the very
narrowly defined terms of a “covered transaction” and “control”
establishes a de jure255 standard for control akin to de jure con-
251. 31 C.F.R. § 800.301 (2011) also expands this definition and covers
transactions to specifically include:
A transaction in which a foreign person conveys its control of a U.S.
business to another person . . . that results or could result in control
by a foreign person of any part of an entity or of assets . . . a joint
venture in which the parties enter into a contractual or other similar
arrangement, including an agreement on the establishment of a new
entity, but only if one or more of the parties contributes a U.S. busi-
ness and a foreign person could control that U.S. business by means
of the joint venture.
252. Control, in this context, is
the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the
ownership of a majority or a dominant minority of the total out-
standing voting interest in an entity, board representation, proxy
voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal
arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct,
or decide important matters affecting an entity; in particular, but
without limitation, to determine, direct, take, reach, or cause deci-
sions . . . or any other similarly important matters affecting an enti-
ty.
31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (2010).
253. 31 C.F.R. § 800.207 (2011)(emphasis added).
254. Id.
255. De jure means “existing by right or according to law”. De jure, BLACK’S
LAWDICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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trol seen in corporate law. Establishing such a standard pro-
vides a savvy investor with a map filled with loopholes by
which they may thwart the regulatory scheme and strategically
circumvent CFIUS review.
CFIUS jurisdiction should not be centered on corporate law
distinctions. Instead, jurisdiction should be channeled through
a more logical and equitable approach in which any transaction
that could pose a security threat is covered. As seen in and ad-
dressed by the Chinese Model, foreign investors can establish
or gain control of a business through transactions outside the
realm of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers, which are the
three primary targets of CFIUS review. Instead of only cover-
ing mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers, a covered transaction
must include leases and other similar transactions, such as
construction and additional investments. Although these
transactions normally bear neither the same economic signifi-
cance nor the same degree of control as mergers or acquisitions,
they nevertheless establish the presence and control of a for-
eign entity in the United States.256
A foreign entity’s mere presence could have severe implica-
tions for national security. Thus, these additional transactions
should be reviewed under the same standards as the more tra-
ditional covered transactions. Furthermore, these additional
transactions allow canny investors to evade CFIUS review by
restructuring transactions that would be covered under the
current legislation into leases, construction, and additional in-
vestments, or into other nontraditional investments such as
256. Leases, along with construction and additional investments, have im-
portance not only in national security, but in economic security as well. Even
though a lease in the traditional sense is not considered an “asset” under
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, leases are still valuable assets in
transactions that greatly affect the immediate geographic area and, there-
fore, may implicate the nation’s economic security. Although economic ramifi-
cations of a lease may be less significant than a merger or acquisition, leases
can still have significant economic impact, making CFIUS review more than
justified. Operating versus Capital Leases, N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS.
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/AccPrimer/lease.htm
(last visited Sept. 29, 2015); see supra Part II.B. As seen in the debate over
the Gulftainer lease, the lease is going to greatly benefit the State of Florida.
See supra Part II.B.
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greenfield investments.257 Since the legislation does not have
an “anti-circumvention clause”258 or a focus on the substance of
the transaction, as seen in the Chinese Model, foreign investors
are able to use alternative investment structures to sidestep
CFIUS reviews.259 Not requiring approvals of such alternative
transactions sets a dangerous precedent for national security.
As a result, the CFIUS review process must look beyond the
form of a transaction and review both the substance of a trans-
action and its effects.
Although a lease may not constitute a change of control, as
defined in section 800.204, or qualify as a transfer of an owner-
ship interest, it nevertheless is the transfer of a legally-
substantiated right.260 This right provides a foreign entity with
a port of entry into the United States and a venue to establish
a presence that can pose serious risks to national security.
Even though section 800.224(f) addresses leases, it only ad-
dresses very limited, long-term leases “under which a lessee
makes substantially all business decisions concerning the op-
eration of a leased entity, as if it were the owner.”261 This pro-
vision and its example262 provides a nebulous gap for interpre-
tation with regard to the control of a leased property. Predicat-
ing CFIUS’s jurisdiction over leases on a temporal factor, ra-
257. A greenfield investment is an investment in which an entity or person
“us[es] capital to begin a new company or create new subsidiaries within the
U.S.” Zucker & Hari, supra note 133, at 188.
258. Alert Memo, supra note 232.
259. See supra Part IV.C.
260. Although this Note focuses on leases, the issues raised and analysis
also applies to construction of facilities, additional or incremental invest-
ments, and the opening of new branches.
261. 31 C.F.R § 800.224(f) (2011).
262. 31 C.F.R. § 800.224 (2011). The example in § 800.224, illustrating
when a lease is not considered a transaction, is as follows:
Corporation A, a foreign person, signs a concession agreement to op-
erate the toll road business of Corporation B, a U.S. business, for 99
years. Corporation B, however, is required under the agreement to
perform safety and security functions with respect to the business
and to monitor compliance by Corporation A with the operating re-
quirements of the agreement on an ongoing basis. Corporation B
may terminate the agreement or impose other penalties for breach of
these operating requirements. Assuming no other relevant facts, this
is not a transaction.
Id.
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ther than the substance or location of a business, does not take
into account issues such as short-term leases in close proximity
to sensitive U.S. government installations or the leasing of dif-
ferent forms of critical infrastructure.263 Concerns stemming
from a business’s proximity to a sensitive U.S. government fa-
cility was seen in the previous controversial CFIUS reviews of
both Ralls264 and the DPW controversy.265 This exact issue is
also raised in the disputed Gulftainer lease.266 In Gulftainer,
however, the transaction was not reviewed because it was a
“simple lease” and therefore not a covered transaction.267 Thus,
CFIUS declined to review the transaction due to its structure,
not a lack of substantive concerns. The Committee failed to in-
voke its jurisdiction, irrespective of the fact that a lease could
pose the same security threat as a transfer of ownership trans-
action. Regardless of whether property is obtained through a
lease, merger, acquisition, or takeover, the threat of close prox-
imity to sensitive U.S. government facilities still occurs due to
the substance of the transaction, not its form. Even though a
foreign person may not have control under the traditional
meaning of the statute or have ownership of the property itself
as a tenant—irrespective of whether a tenant is long-term or
temporary—the presence of foreign leaseholders in certain lo-
cations could lead to national security threats. Hence, leases
and other similar transactions must fall within CFIUS jurisdic-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Ralls, its predecessors, and the current economic climate
raise the desperate call for reform of the CFIUS process. Alt-
263. Jeremy Zucker & Hrishikesh Hari, Gone with the Wind II: The Ralls
Decision and Lesson for Foreign Investors, 9 GLOBAL TRADE & CUSTOMS J. 44,
46 (2014).
264. See supra Part II.C. Previously, Chinese nationals did not encounter
issues acquiring windfarms located further from sensitive locations. Gold-
wind’s Shady Oaks Project located in Illinois and the Sany windfarm in Texas
were not subject to CFIUS review. Zucker & Hari, supra note 133, at 187 (cit-
ing Edward Alden, Guest Post: Ralls v. CFIUS: What are the Implications
for Chinese Investment?, RENEWING AM. (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/10/05/ralls-vs-cfius-what-are-the-
implications-for-chinese-investment/.)
265. See supra Part II.A.
266. See supra Part II.B.
267. Bonney, supra note 120.
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hough Congresswoman DeLauro’s proposed legislation at-
tempted to answer this demand, the amendments miss the
mark, failing to solve the recurring problems with the CFIUS
review process.268 CFIUS legislation must not be expanded to
include a “net benefit” review or to explicitly define “national
security.”269 Rather, CFIUS jurisdiction must be expanded to
include additional types of transactions that include leases,
construction, and additional investments. By appropriating
concepts from China’s national security review that focus on
the substance and effect of a transaction, rather than its
form,270 CFIUS reviews will better fulfill the agency’s original
purpose of protecting national security by impartial regulation
of FDI. Additionally, CFIUS’s implementing legislation will no
longer provide a blueprint for corrupt foreign investors who at-
tempt to establish a presence within the United States under
the guise of a corporation. By shedding its focus on traditional
corporate law distinctions and adopting a more equitable ap-
proach to establishing CFIUS’s jurisdiction, the legislation will
both alter and deter foreign investors from thwarting CFIUS
review. With these proposed amendments, the United States
will not only be a more secure nation, but will remain a promi-
nent power in the global marketplace.
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